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There seems to be general discontent with US agricultural policy. Fiscal 
conservatives want to eliminate farm bill spending, which is in their eyes, the 
epitome of wasteful big government.1 Environmentalists want to end a government 
policy that shovels billions of dollars into subsidies, which supposedly encourage 
farmers to plant fencerow to fencerow while ignoring the destructive ecological 
footprint of modern agriculture.2 
Fiscal conservatives who want to eliminate farm bill spending entirely are 
applying free market theory without appreciation for the historical context of 
modern farm support. Reducing farm bill spending has long been a goal for policy 
makers, but the farm support system is fragile and its removal has proved 
complicated. If nothing else, the relatively recent failed attempt to phase out farm 
support payments in 1996 should serve a reminder that eliminating or phasing out 
farm bill spending could devastate rural America and drag the whole of the nation’s 
economy down with it.3 Though many policy makers would like to see farm bill 
spending decrease, it is undoubtedly tricky to deflate any multibillion-dollar bubble 
in the economy without destroying a lot of people’s livelihood. Yet some libertarians 
and fiscal conservatives insist that US agricultural policy is an unjustified violation 
of the free-market. From the onset of classical economic theory in the 19th century, 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, critics of their time, encourage us to respect the 
freedom of markets so as to promote specialization and the subsequent economic 
growth. From their historical context of the Mercantilist era, they were wise to 
suggest the removal of state policies that were corrosive to the economy; tariffs and 
other forms of what was virtually legal economic warfare amongst the rival nation 
                                                        
1 Dan Morgan, “The Farm Bill and Beyond,” Economic Policy Paper Series (2010), German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 15. 
2 Craig Cox, Andrew Hug, Nils Bruzelius, Losing Ground, Environmental Working Group (Washington: 
2011), 29. 
3 Daryll Ray, 1996 Farm Bill: A Pattern for Future Legislation or Failed Experiment, Agricultural Policy 
Analysis Center (2001) University of Tennessee.  
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states of Europe.4 But just because the removal of mercantilist government 
economic policies was preferable during the time of Smith and Ricardo, it does not 
logically follow that governments ought to always keep out of economic affairs. A 
faith in the invisible hand is equivalent to the Naturalistic Fallacy; just because there 
are natural tendencies for things to happen (like Hurricane Katrina, for example, or 
the boom and bust of speculative agriculture that led to the dust bowl), it doesn’t 
not follow that these are good things. Smith advocated for free trade because it was 
in the interests of the public and general welfare from his historical context. If some 
government policy would change market conditions in the interest of the people 
(many do), Smith, given his reasons for advocating for free trade, should then agree 
that the state ought to intervene in the market for this instance. Free-market 
economics does not mean zero government involvement; it means setting the 
optimal conditions of free competition. Occasionally this has meant the breaking of 
trusts and monopolies that were corrosive to free competition and public welfare. 
Ultimately there’s no such thing, literally, as a totally free market, devoid of 
government involvement – other than anarchy – because every society puts forth 
the conditions under which markets operate. And so the ultimate question of 
political economics is, what conditions ought we set for our markets? The question 
is not should the government intervene in markets?, but in what ways should the 
government do so. The goal of this essay is to determine the conditions the US 
federal government should set for agricultural markets, and it takes for granted the 
justification for having an economic agricultural policy of some kind. 
Some environmentalists are appalled by the spending on subsidies and the 
lack of conservation measures present in US agricultural policy. They would have 
policy makers step up conservation compliance measures and finally beat back 
agribusiness in the fight for conservation.5 I argue that these kinds of 
environmentalists are unpragmatic in thinking that the best course of action is to 
construct new public policies that will overcome the interests of farmers and 
                                                        
4 Laura LaHaye, "Mercantilism," The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 
5 Cox et al., Losing Ground, 29. 
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agribusiness, the interest groups who effectively write the farm bill. But more 
importantly, such environmentalists should pick and choose their battles. Farmers 
and agribusinesses are indeed concerned with conservation and sustainability; after 
all, the longevity of their industry depends on it. The problem is that market forces 
push farmers, like any supplier in any market, into remaining financially 
competitive. Short run market forces determine farming practices. Long run 
ecological and economic costs, like soil erosion, are discounted over time, meaning 
that only a fraction of the real ecological costs of farming practices is considered in 
farmers’ present decision making. For this reason, US agricultural policy must 
internalize the externalities of farming, so that price effective farming coincides with 
sustainability. The most straightforward way to achieve this goal is to tax farmers 
the additional social cost of their farming practices.  
In order to argue with any good sense about agricultural policy one must 
understand the history of agricultural policy and also the state of modern 
agriculture. And the closer one looks at the present state of agriculture, the more the 
global agricultural economy appears a complex and problematic system. The Earth 
has 13.5 billion hectares of land and approximately 7.1 billion mouths to feed. 
Despite the fact that we produce enough food to feed the world, 854 million people 
suffer from malnourishment due to disproportionate distribution (and even if it 
were distributed, simply in the sense of made available for purchase, those who are 
malnourished would still lack the purchasing power for sufficient food).6 The global 
population is still growing, so that we expect another 2 or 3 billion mouths to feed 
by 2050, with the greatest growth rates in nations with lower incomes and 
purchasing power and higher levels of soil degradation.7 This increased population 
will mean increased demand for agricultural commodities, but beyond simple 
population growth, the demand for agricultural commodities will greatly increase 
due to rising incomes in developing nations, bringing families out of poverty into the 
                                                        
6 Pedro A Sanchez and M. S. Swaminathan, “Cutting World Hunger in Half” Science Vol. 309 (January 
2005), 357. 
7 Douglas L. Karlen and Charles W. Rice, “Soil Degradation: Will Human Kind Ever Learn?” 
Sustainability Vol. 7 (2015), 12490. 
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middle class and increasing demand for less resource-efficient foods like meat and 
dairy. One OECD study predicts that 3 billion people will enter the ‘middle class’ 
over the next 20 years (as defined by a daily income of $10-$100 dollars/day), and if 
we assumed that each of those 3 billion people consume one-tenth a pound of beef a 
day, this would mean a 73% increase in beef consumption by 2050.8 It takes about 
six to eight pounds of feed grains (often corn or soybeans) to produce one pound of 
beef, and so as demand increases for meat (especially beef) demand for other 
agricultural commodities will grow significantly. In the best-case scenario in which 
we solve the problems of poverty and malnourishment, we still need to double food 
production in order to feed everyone.9 Demand is growing, but due to land 
degradation across the globe, the resources to supply demand are decreasing. As the 
world’s largest producer and exporter of agricultural commodities, the United States 
must be prepared for these incoming trends.  
Between 1961 and 2000 global food production increased 146% while land 
used for agriculture increased only 8%. However, this amazing rate of increased 
production efficiency should not be expected to occur again. The improvements of 
that time period were the result of the ‘Green Revolution’ in which farmers in 
different areas of the developing world began, for the first time, applying fertilizers, 
planting with selective genetic traits (e.g. Bt corn), nutrients, and irrigation. And 
though the Green Revolution has greatly contributed to global agricultural 
production and economic development in the productive areas concerned, soil 
resources have been severely degraded in many instances from this agricultural 
intensification.10 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations reported in 2011 that 25% of all agricultural land on Earth is ‘highly 
degraded’, meaning that it cannot be used reliably for food production.11  
                                                        
8 United Nation’s Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012), Resilient 
People, Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing. New York: United Nations, 35.  
9 Jonathan A. Foley, “Can We Feed the World and Sustain the Planet: A five-step global plan could 
double food production by 2050 while greatly reducing environmental damage,” Scientific American 
(November 2011), 62. 
10 Karlen and Rice, “Soil Degradation,” 12495. 
11 FAO. 2011, State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture. Summary 
Report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 18. 
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Urban-sprawl development poses another limit to increasing agricultural 
production. In the US between 1987 and 2007, 41 million acres of farmland was 
developed into urban areas. This is 41 million acres of some our best, most fertile 
land that will not be used for agricultural production in the foreseeable future.12 
One study estimates that the Ogallala Aquifer, which has been the source of 
irrigation on the Southern Plains of the US since the 1940s after the dust bowl, will 
be depleted in the next 80-100 years.13 A similar decline of water resources is 
occurring in Northern China, where 4/5th of cropland is irrigated and ground water 
levels are decreasing at a rate of 0.5 – 3 meters/year (along with increased nitrate 
contamination in the remaining groundwater from excessive application of chemical 
fertilizers).14 Despite being unsustainable at its current rate of use, irrigation plays a 
huge role in productivity – 40 percent of the world’s food comes from the 18 
percent of the world’s cropland that is irrigated.15  
These issues are but a few of the blemishes in the relationship between our 
agriculture and ecology. But none of these previously mentioned issues 
singlehandedly represents this flawed relationship as well as soil erosion. Soil 
erosion is a nearly inevitable result of practicing farming; whether the soil is tilled 
or not, whether we use cover crops and strip cropping, whether we plant close to 
watersheds or leave buffer-zones, farming leads to soil erosion by wind and water. 
And the erosion of soil is no small matter for farmers. Soil erosion is known to 
decrease yields and productivity.16 Many farmers implement these just 
aforementioned conservation measures, but if the current trends of soil erosion 
(and land degradation generally) remain, agriculture will suffer in the long run. 
                                                        
12 Nikos Alexandratos and Jelle Bruinsma, “World Agriculture Towards 2015/2030: The 2012 
Revision”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ESA Working Paper No. 12-03 
(2012), Accessed November 18, 2015, www.fao.org/economic/esa.  
13 Leonard F. Konikow, “Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900−2008),” U.S. Geological 
Survey, Scientific Investigations Report 2013−5079, p. 63   
http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079 (Available only online.) 
14 Matthew J Currell, et al, “Sustainability of Groundwater Usage in Northern China: Dependence on 
Paleowaters and Effects on Water Quality, Quantity and Ecosystem Health,” Hydrological Processes 
Vol. 26, 4050-4066. 
15 Sandra Postel, “Safeguarding Freshwater Ecosystems,” State of the World 2006: A Worldwatch 
Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, (2006), 41-60. 
16 Rattan Lal and B.A. Stewart, Soil Degredation, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990). 
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Some farmers and agribusinesses are more aware than others of this problematic 
paradigm, and work hard towards achieving sustainable agriculture, but their 
efforts are in conflict with short run market forces and the global ‘price-war’ of 
agricultural commodities.  
This essay seeks to explore policy solutions for reconciling private enterprise 
with sustainable agriculture. In order to gain a practical grasp on the complex issue 
of sustainable agriculture, this essay will focus on soil erosion. How can US 
government policy reconcile the economic security of farmers and the longevity of 
our soil resources? This essay answers that question by suggesting a traditional 
economic approach for creating a new kind of US agricultural policy, one that uses a 
soil erosion tax in order to reflect the long run costs of ecological damage into the 
present acts of farming. This proposed soil erosion tax would establish short run 
market forces that push farmers towards practicing agriculture in a more 
permanent and sustainable way. Secondarily, the recommended policy would 
continue to support farmers against downside risks so that the additional tax-cost 
doesn’t put farmers out of business, but merely incentivizes conservation practices. 
Finally, the new agricultural policy must consider any externalities of implementing 
a soil erosion tax, such as decreased exports and perhaps the increased price of 
food. 
The goal of reconciling private agriculture and ecological conservation is 
nothing new. And so in order to see why a break from the mold of previously failed 
conservation policies is necessary, this essay utilizes a historical case study 
approach. The first part of this essay is an examination of the American dust bowl 
events. This historical model will be used to gain a better understanding of the 
paradigm between private enterprise and agricultural sustainability. It is from the 
historical lessons of the dust bowl that it becomes clear why we have a government 
agricultural policy, and why a successful agricultural policy for the future must 
incentivize conservation farming while respecting the autonomy and decision 
making of individual farmers. Part B of this essay will then examine our current 
predicament and the plausibility and ramifications of this essay’s suggested policy 





The Dust Bowl: An archetype of agriculture and ecological limits 
 
The ‘dust bowl’ was a decade on the southern plains, in the 1930s, plagued by 
drought, failed crops, soil erosion by wind, dust storms, and black blizzards. 
Speculative growth in agriculture led to oversupply and an extreme supply glut in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. Suddenly, many farmers couldn’t afford to plant 
crops on the land they had torn and plowed the native sod from. Millions of acres 
were left bare and uncovered by vegetation when drought hit hard and lingered 
through the decade of the 30s. The typical winds of the Great Plains turned into 
highly atypical and terrifying dust storms. Although the entire American Great 
Plains suffered drought and dust storms throughout the decade, the ‘dust bowl’ 
refers to the worst hit areas: north Texas, northeastern New Mexico, southeastern 
Colorado, the western half of Kansas, the western Oklahoma panhandle, and parts of 
southern Nebraska.17 George Borgstrom, an expert on world food problems, ranked 
the dust bowl one of the three worst ecological mishaps in human history18; but 
unlike the deforestation of the Chinese uplands (in approximately 3000 BC) and the 
erosion of Mediterranean lands due to overgrazing livestock (occurring over 
centuries since ancient times) the dust bowl took only 50 years of human settlement 
to accomplish. 19  
 
 
                                                        
17 Timothy Egan. The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American 
Dust Bowl, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006) xi. 
18 George Borgstrom, World Food Resources (New York: Intext Educational Publishers, 1973), 203. 





A map of the Dust Bowl Region20 
 
 
Examining the history of the dust bowl is useful in considering agricultural 
policy today, because it illustrates the relationship between agriculture, ecological 
limits, and economic policy. The account that follows is indirectly related to the 
argument for a soil erosion tax in that it explains the origins of farm support system. 
The history of the dust bowl is directly related to the argument for a soil erosion tax 
in two ways: first, that the dust bowl was an emphatic example of the natural 
market tendency for farmers to ignore ecological limits in favor of short run market 
forces, and secondly, that a successful conservation policy that incentives more 
ecologically friendly practices must do so in a pragmatic way that respects the 
autonomy and private decision making of farmers. This second point is like the 
idiom, you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink; policy makers 
would do well to learn from failed conservation policies of the dust bowl era and 
                                                        
20 Image taken from PBS website and from the film Surviving the Dust Bowl: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/dustbowl/  
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since, and apply an objective tax code that incentivizes conservation practices while 
allowing farmers to freely make the decision to change on their own terms. 
 
 
Section 1: Pre-Dust Bowl Forces 
First, what caused the dust bowl? Identifying the causal chains of historical 
events can be incredibly complex - there are many different contributing factors to 
political ecological events. One might answer this question with drought, or 
industrialized commercial farming practices, but these are each necessary and not 
sufficient causes. Also not sufficient, but more fundamental causes of the dust bowl 
are the social, political, and economic forces that pushed American agricultural 
practices to behave in that given way. This section will illustrate some of these 
underlying causes.  
The answer to this question is deeply multifaceted; there are a combination 
of ecological, economic, policy, and cultural forces that led to the ecological 
imbalance of the 1930s dust bowl. And though it may seem impossible to identify 
that which is common to all of the diverse causes of the dust bowl, Donald Worster’s 
Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s does exactly that, by blaming the 
cultural values of America - values best described as ‘capitalism’ - as the underlying 
force of the various different events that created dust bowl.21 Paul Robbins writes in 
his teaching textbook, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, a critical survey of 
this growing field: 
Donald Worster in a prominent example [of critical environmental history] 
turned his attention to the American Dust Bowl, where drought and intensive 
farming methods together contributed to soil loss, blowing dust clouds, and 
the disruption of millions of rural lives, including bankruptcy and starvation 
in the 1930s. His work concludes that the ravages of the landscape were a 
nearly inescapable result of increased risk-taking farming behavior growing 
                                                        
21 Worster’s Dust Bowl has been the most useful and influential source for the Part A of this essay. 
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from a capitalist agricultural economies established in the previous 
decades.22 
Worster provides an extensive analysis of the dust bowl crisis addressing why the 
dust bowl occurred, what happened, and what policies were enacted in response 
(and why such policies proved not fully effective). Most importantly, Worster’s 
account of the genesis of US agricultural policy and soil conservation illustrates the 
impracticality of localized community oversight and voluntary conservation 
compliance, providing historical justification for a different approach to agricultural 
conservation policy. 
Worster describes the dust bowl as the failure of farming practices to 
ecologically adapt to the southern plains.23 He argues that our cultural values are 
the primary cause of this adaptive failure, specifically the set of American values he 
calls the “capitalist ethos.” Worster claims that the way we use the land is dependent 
on our cultural ecological values. He summarizes American ecological values, as 
taught by the capitalist ethos, in three maxims: 1) “Nature must always be seen as 
capital,” in other words, the land is seen only as an input of production, not as the 
complex ecological balance that it really is; 2) “Man has a right, even an obligation to 
use this capital for constant self-advancement,” by which Worster means that the 
land must be used to maximize and produce greater wealth each year; and 3) “The 
social order should permit and encourage this continual increase of personal 
wealth,” in other words, that there be no community interference between a farmer 
and their profit maximization.24 These cultural-ecological values in their summation 
encouraged an unbounded optimism in the American plains settler. Though there 
was surely an element of greed in the speculative growth agriculture before it’s 
collapse in the 1930s, this was not a black and white problem where ambitious and 
greed-driven farmers were entirely to blame for their own demise, as most plains 
settlers were opportunity-seeking immigrants, desperately hoping for more than 
the land could be safely asked to provide. Indeed, illusionary optimism is common to 
                                                        
22 Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 66. 
23 Worster, Dust Bowl, 43. 
24 Worster, Dust Bowl, 6. 
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every epoch, as we tend to believe that we walk the path of progress. No one would 
convince the plains settler that they could not farm the dry marginalized land of the 
southern plains. Ultimately even the black blizzards of the 1930s would fail to 
restrain this optimism. 
The identification of American cultural values (the capitalist ethos) as the 
common denominator amongst the various forces that created the dust bowl is a 
good theory. The dust bowl crisis was the result of human behavior and our 
behavior is reinforced by our enduring cultural values. Cultural values are heavily 
influenced by the way we organize society for production and so unsurprisingly, 
greater productivity is an eagerly embraced cultural value. In the decades leading up 
to the dustbowl, due to both ignorance and hubris, our cultural values led to greatly 
speculative and irresponsible agriculture. Millions of acres of native sod were 
exchanged for the hottest cash crop, wheat, changing the land that had depended 
upon prairie grass for millennia and the wind erosion that resulted was 
catastrophic. Ecological limits in our relationship to the earth were ignored in 
preference for immediate profits and increased productivity.  
However, Worster’s theory does not provide a viable solution. Placing of 
blame on cultural values implies that alternative values are possible. Instead of our 
endless crusade for greater wealth and producing the maximum wealth from the 
soil for our personal improvement, Worster believes our culture could reinforce 
values that treat the soil and the whole environment as more than a commodity to 
be squeezed of its value. The Plains Indians serves as his model for alternative 
cultural-ecological values. In contrast to the American capitalist ethos, Worster 
describes the spiritual conservation ethic of the Native Americans who had lived on 
the plains in a relatively better state of human-ecological harmony. Unlike the 
supposedly autonomous and nature dominating westerner, the Native Americans of 
the plains understood that they were a part of the natural balance, dependent on the 
grasslands. They did not have an American-style growth culture. They used nature 
with complete (and spiritual) reverence, restraining their wants and numbers to 
respect the limits of the land. While western values, rooted in Christianity, promote 
excessive propagation, Plains Indians deliberately restricted their frequency of 
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births. Worster says that these earthly holistic values, of intimacy with the land and 
scaling their ‘needs’ to a limited world and scarce resources are common amongst 
old-world cultures that have stood the test of time.25 American plains settlers (along 
with the whole nation) clearly lacked these traits, proudly self-identifying as 
‘sodbusters’.26 However, beyond citing Native American values, as ecologically 
superior, Worster is vague on the topic of alternatives to commercial farming and 
provides no specifics on how to achieve this cultural revolution. 
Worster’s lack of alternatives should not however diminish the weight of his 
primary argument, that the cultural impetus that we might call capitalism is a 
driving force for all of the underlying economic and political forces that developed 
into the dust bowl of the 1930s. If we accept his thesis, then the next step is to look 
at the specific ways those values were manifest. The various political and economic 
forces are also highly relevant in understanding what caused the dust bowl. After all, 
this essay seeks to draw lessons for agricultural policy solutions in the present, and 
the revision of cultural values is not a practical policy solution.   
 The dust bowl comprised some of the most marginal land on the Great Plains, 
least suited for agriculture. On an expedition into the newly acquired American 
lands of the Louisiana Purchase, Zebulon Pike followed the Arkansas River up into 
the Rocky Mountains and witnessed sprawling sand dunes in part of the Southern 
Plains. What he saw was likely some riverbed blowing out during a dry season. 
Pike’s report in 1806 suggested that the interior plains, soon dubbed the Great 
American Desert, were an insurmountable restriction to Western expansion. 
Though its aridity was indeed exaggerated, Pike saw the ecology on its own terms, 
unlike the settlers that would follow.27 
 Before settlers came to the southern plains, they settled upon the more 
fertile soils of the Great Plains. The Homestead Act of 1862, the legislative 
embodiment of Jeffersonian Democracy, was a force for settlement on the plains for 
decades, even after its ironic reversal in 1936 with the creation of the resettlement 
                                                        
25 Worster, Dust Bowl, 77. 
26 Worster, Dust Bowl, 96. 
27 Worster, Dust Bowl, 80-81. 
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administration, which aimed to evacuate areas of homestead land.28 The original 
Homestead Act allowed settlers 160 acres of property after 5 years of making 
‘improvements’ on the land, by which the government meant cultivation.29 
Homesteading was Jeffersonian because Thomas Jefferson idealized the small 
farmer as the true American and envisioned an American democracy comprised of 
more and more small farmers. But because the population would inevitably grow 
and the opportunity for each person to farm would diminish if constrained to 
limited land, the nation would need to continuously acquire more land. The spirit of 
the Homestead Acts was an expression of growth culture; we will not have peace 
and justice unless our economy (in Jefferson’s eyes, our land) is constantly 
growing.30 Today, the legacy of the homestead acts is mixed. In many cases it indeed 
contributed to opportunity and prosperity on the land for many hardworking farm 
families and established farming operations in fertile areas. But as market forces 
demanded more production from each farm unit, and the more fertile lands had 
already been claimed so that homesteaders began farming less desirable land like 
southern plains, the Homestead Acts became “almost an obligatory act of poverty.”31 
Even the Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, which increased the acreage allotment 
from 160 to 320 acres32, proved adequate only for a few years until market forces (a 
massive surge in settlement and increase in aggregate market production) pushed 
the operating costs even higher than what 320 acres of crops could cover.33  
 Despite hardships, the optimism of the frontier was unquenchable. There 
was an ideological backlash to those who spoke of a Great American Desert. Charles 
Dana Wilber, a town builder in Nebraska provides an explicit example of faith in the 
cultivation of the southern plains. Quoting the book of Genesis, Book 2, Chapters 5 
and 6 in his journal, Wilber wrote “But there went up a mist from the Earth and 
watered the whole face of the ground; for the Lord God had not sent rain upon the 
                                                        
28 Worster, Dust Bowl, 229 
29 Worster, Dust Bowl, 82. 
30 Worster, Dust Bowl, 80. 
31 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 268. 
32 Worster, Dust Bowl, 87. 
33 Worster, Dust Bowl, 92. 
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earth, (because) and there was no man to till the ground.” Wilber interprets this 
biblical passage as meaning that the earth began first in a state of desert, of dew 
rising into mist under the heat of day then falling onto the earth again at night, until 
man came and tilled the land and brought about vegetation:  
Everywhere under these new conditions of husbandry, the clouds will gather 
into larger clouds and overspread the heavens; and the impending shower 
will fall upon the farm and garden, not by grace or fortuity, but by an external 
law… In this miracle of progress, the plow was the avant courier – the 
unerring prophet – the procuring cause. Not by any magic or enchantment, 
not by the incantations or offerings, but, instead, in the sweat of his face, 
toiling with his hands, man can persuade the heavens to yield their treasures 
of dew and rain upon the land he has chosen for a dwelling place. It is indeed 
a grand consent, or rather concert of the forces – the human energy or toil, 
the vital seed, and the polished raindrop that never fails to fall in answer to 
the imploring power of prayer of labor.34 
Wilber argued that rain would follow the plow, and as absurd as it sounds, he wasn’t 
alone. Scientists (or quacks) assured settlers that the steam from locomotion traffic 
would increase precipitation.35 Never underestimate the desire to rationalize our 
unfounded desires.  
Twenty inches of rainfall had been the standard threshold for growing crops 
without irrigation, but the southern plains and much of the western Great Plains 
were below that threshold. In addition, it takes 22 inches of rain in the Oklahoma 
panhandle to deposit the same amount of moisture into the soil as 15 inches or rain 
in the upper-Mississippi River valley. The vegetation that had evolved under these 
conditions was unlike that of any cash crop; mesquite, a native plant, sends its roots 
down as far as 150 feet in order to find water. 36 Unsurprisingly, the feasibility of 
small agricultural holds on the more arid areas of the plains was seriously 
                                                        
34 Henry Nash Smith, “The Rain Follows the Plow: The Notion of Increased Rainfall for the Great 
Plains, 1844-1880”, Huntington Library Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 2 (Feb, 1947), 188-189. 
35 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 25. 
36 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 22-24. 
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challenged not long after the 1862 homestead legislation. Drought and grasshopper 
plagues ravaged the Great Plains in the early 1870s prompting a wave of 
outmigration, mostly people leaving Kansas.37 In 1878, director of the US Geological 
Survey, John Wesley Powell suggested sweeping revisions of the Homestead Act in 
his Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States. Everywhere west of 
the 100 Meridian (roughly down the middle of the Dakotas all the way down to 
Texas) he reported that there was not enough rainfall for raising crops and that a 
160-acre allotment was insufficient for a single family. Powell proposed that 
instead, the government provide 2560 acreage ‘pasturage farms’ in order to raise 
livestock. The proposal was denounced not only as elitist and un-Jeffersonian, but 
also too pessimistic about the region itself. But when drought hit again in the 1890s, 
and entire communities of farmers in the western Dakotas and eastern Montana 
were abandoned, Powell’s suggestions gained some credibility. 38 During and after 
the 1930s, Powell’s report was popularized again. Some New Dealers referenced 
Powell in their belief that the key to successful agriculture in the region was 
decreasing the number of, and allowing for, larger farming units.39 Certainly that’s 
where the market forces were headed in the 1930s – the decade was a crisis of 
overproduction, and in theory, the free market equilibrium would have been 
‘naturally’ accomplished when the less efficient farming units went into bankruptcy, 
and the total number of farming units decreased, along with aggregate production. 
Given this fact of market equilibrium, politically aiding the removal of farming units 
might have been wise. But Worster disagrees with Powell. In accredit to Powell’s 
views, Worster says that at least he recognized ecological reality, rather than an 
optimistic fantasy, and that he certainly wasn’t an elitist, but genuinely hoped to 
make total westward expansion redeemable in the face of likely failure. But to 
Powell’s discredit, Worster thinks he saw only the economic circumstances of his 
day and assumed that one adjustment of farmers’ income would create a sustainable 
plains settlement, when in fact a real solution would need to address the fact of 
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economies of scale, the trend of farms becoming larger and for a fewer number of 
farmers in the whole market. He failed to see the economic trajectory on which we 
all travel. 
Though settlement policy was not revised in the late 19th century, the 
hardships on the semi-arid plains did trigger an agricultural adaption effort that 
became known as dryland farming. It was the advent of new agronomic practices 
that made farming regions like the southern plains relatively reliable (at least 
during the fortunate years). The introduction of ‘drought resistant’ Turkey red, a 
variety of Russian winter wheat, introduced to the plains by Germans from Russia, 
provided a feasible cash crop for the land. Campbell’s Soil Culture Manual, by the 
South Dakota homesteader Hardy Webster Campbell, became a government-
endorsed must-have for every plains settler, though its agronomic suggestions were 
quite primitive. Campbell emphasized that small amounts of rainfall could be stored 
in the ground by increasing the moisture retention of soil. He prescribed that the 
ground be pulverized by disking, leaving a smooth surface. The subsoil should be 
packed, strengthening the root-bed (and supposedly pulling up ground water 
through capillary action!). To protect from evaporation, Campbell called for 
cultivation after each rain to build up fine dust mulch (in the hindsight of the dust 
bowl, clearly a poor idea). Later he adjusted his methods to advocate mulch made 
from soil clods, known as aggregates, not dust.40   
 With the improved confidence of dryland farming agronomy, and the 
Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 (which was amended in 1912 so that the time 
allotted for improvements to the land decreased from five to three years), a new 
surge of settlement came like nothing before. In 1912, there were 24,000 new 
homestead entries; in 1913, there were 53,000 entries. The rate of settlement 
decreased, but stayed above 30,000 entries annually until the 1920s. And the size of 
farm units grew from averaging 256 acres in 1890 to averaging 813 acres in 1930. 
The increase in agricultural production was both spurred by and coincidentally 
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matched increased demand, due to growing urban centers in America and growing 
exports, especially during WWI. The price of wheat was favorable between 1909 
and 1914 at around $1 per bushel, but in 1919, the price rose to $2.50. Just to 
emphasize the magnitude of the increased demand due to foreign markets, this rise 
in prices coincided with a 70 percent increase in wheat production from 1917 to 
1919.41 Increased wheat planting, instead of other corps, and a bountiful harvest 
year were largely responsible for this increase, but also, of the 13.5 million acres 
increase in wheat acreage from 1909-1913 (years later used to calculate ‘parity’ - 
the golden standard for supposedly fair farm unit purchasing power) 11 million 
acres were on newly plowed land. 42 With such an increase in production, one would 
expect prices to lower, not skyrocket to $2.50. Global demand for agricultural 
commodities was incredibly high following the blockades and burnt crops of WWI.43 
  If 1910 – 1930 was the time in which the seeds of the dust bowl were 
planted, one force behind the dust bowl must be industrial agricultural technology, 
which came in the form of a tractor and was just then arriving on the scene. Fordism 
was being applied to agriculture on the plains, not only in the implementation of 
modern machinery, but also with the widespread application of commercial 
monocropping (specializing in a single cash crop, in contrast to diversified, or even 
subsistence farming). New technology dramatically increased labor efficiency; from 
1910 – 1930 the labor involved in agriculture decreased by one-third while 
production rose by one-third. In 1830 it had taken 58 hours to harvest one acre of 
wheat, but in 1930, it took less than three hours on the most advanced farms. The 
tractor, along with the disk plow and the harvester-thresher (named the combine 
for its dual function) that were pulled behind it, completed the industrial 
mechanization of an early 20th century farm. But these machines were an 
investment, and often required mortgages. From 1910 to 1920, the average cost of 
implements on an average Kansas farm went from $292 to $980; farming was 
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becoming an increasingly capitalized industry. When prices depressed after the 
recovery of European markets, smaller, less efficient farm units were squeezed out 
of the US market, often because they defaulted on their machinery mortgages.44 
Economies of scale are a reality; those who pioneer larger and more industrialized 
farms set the pace, and those who can’t keep up must drop out. 
In 1920, the price of wheat was approximately $2 a bushel. In 1928, many 
were predicting $1.50, but after a neither perfect nor disastrous harvest, the price of 
wheat came in around $1.00.45 In 1930, wheat went for 30 cents a bushel – there 
was so much excess supply it was piling up outside the grain elevators. Despite a 
small drought on the southern plains that year, bumper crops in the northern plains 
brought in far more wheat than what was demanded for consumption. ‘Suitcase 
farmers’ – farmers who were not permanent residents of their land - had been 
eagerly tearing up sod in order to get their share in the wheat bonanza, but when 
prices depressed, they were the first to abandon their land, leaving their fields 
fallow and uncovered, letting the soil dry up and blow into dust.46 The price of 
wheat was falling, along with other agricultural commodities because the supply 
had increased while demand had decreased due to the beginning of the Great 
Depression. Farmers’ revenue was simply insufficient to cover operating costs. But 
for those who couldn’t leave the land so easily, there was seemingly only one option: 
plant more. The fall of 1930 saw more ‘virgin’ soil plowed up than ever before.47 
Farmers were digging deeper into their own grave, searching for a miracle, but 
instead the 1930s only brought the rural economy into the grave with them. 
 
 
Section 2: The Dust Bowl: The Event Itself 
 
 
What was plains ecology like before American/Anglo settlement and 
development? One of the biggest challenges to critical environmental history is 
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simply the lack of historical data on the environment.48 Nonetheless, Worster 
identifies several basic aspects of this ecology that seem certain. There existed an 
array of biodiversity with the primary producer being one of the several prairie 
grasses that sprawled over the land seemingly forever in every direction. Short-
grass parries where more common in the drier southern plains, and tall-grass in the 
wetter north. Worster cites estimates that Buffalo grass on the southern plains once 
supported 30 million bison.49 Though the grass would sometimes die during 
droughts, it would remain rooted and still hold the soil in place.50 With western 
settlement, ecological reality was traded for economic realism. Native sod has little 
economic value and was torn up in favor of cultivated fields at incredible rates 
through the early 20th century. In 1879, 10 million acres of the Great Plains were 
plowed. Fifty years later in 1929, that number was 100 million acres.51 When the 
extended drought of the 1930s hit, planted crops failed to grow and the earth was 
left bare for plains wind to lift the precious soil into black blizzards, carrying it 
sometimes all the way to the Atlantic. The dust bowl occurred specifically on the 
southern plains (in north Texas, western Oklahoma, southeastern Colorado, western 
Kansas, and southwestern Nebraska) because this semiarid land proved too volatile 
an ecosystem to survive the destruction of its native sod. Agriculture had pushed the 
land beyond its breaking point. In the words of Worster, “Here on the edges of the 
fertile earth man needed to summon all of the cooperative, self-effacing, cautious 
elements of his nature to live successfully; Americans however, found precisely 
those qualities the hardest to nurture and express.”52 Following the immediate 
demands of the market, farmers tended to disregard the ecological limits of their 
environment. With the onset of the dust bowl, the ecologically destructive 
inhabitants of the land were finally reaping what they had sown. 
The extended drought of the 1930s came at an especially inopportune time. 
The farm economy was already in shambles. In part, the expansionary growth of 
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agriculture on the southern plains was spurred by years of generous precipitation; 
from 1926-1930, Boise City, the seat of Cimarron County Oklahoma, averaged over 
19 inches of annual rainfall. In 1932, drought hit and annual precipitation was only 
12 inches that year. In 1934, there was less than 9 inches of annual rainfall and over 
the five years between 1931 and 1936, the county averaged just less than 12 inches. 
The effect of the drought on yields was devastating. In the 1920s, farmers in 
Cimarron County averaged yields of 13.1 bushels/acre, but throughout the 1930s, 
they averaged a meager 0.9 bushels/acre.53 Without the drought, the dust bowl 
would never have come about. 
The measured amount of soil lost on the Great Plains due to erosion in the 
1930s is not exactly known, but the estimates are extreme. Before the dust bowl, 
Americans had mostly ignored the possibility of soil limitations. In 1909, a report by 
the Bureau of Soils stated, “The soil is the one indestructible, immutable asset that 
the nation possesses. It is the one resource that cannot be exhausted; that cannot be 
used up.”54 This is entirely false. Soil erosion by wind and water on cultivated land 
has depleted soil resources over the past century by operating with erosion rates 
greater than soil formation rates.55 In the 1930s, the US suffered the most extreme 
and sustained wind erosion ever recorded, across the whole plains. Wind erosion 
severity is strongly associated with the type of soil – sandy soil is eroded more 
easily than clayey soil. The dust bowl occurred where it did mostly because the soil 
was more easily susceptible to wind erosion.56 The intense dusters and black 
blizzards of the dust bowl left their mark in ecological damage. In the single year of 
1935, an estimated more than 850 million tons of topsoil had blown off the southern 
plains. At the end of the year, there were 5 million acres deemed with “little chance 
of ever being cultivated again,” and the USDA considered for the first time that 
farmers were currently on 100 million acres that “might never be productive 
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farmland.”57 In the worst hit areas, even the grasslands that had been preserved for 
grazing were smothered by dust, some ten feet under.58 In Baca County Colorado 
alone, more than 1.1 million acres were so eroded they were estimated to never 
support crops again.59 By 1938, 10 million acres had lost at least five inches of 
topsoil, and another 13.5 million acres had lost at least two and half inches.60 
The social collapse of the dust bowl was nearly as violent as the ecological 
one. Though the whole nation’s rural economy was in shambles during the early 
1930s, it was farmers on the plains, especially the southern plains, who suffered 
most. In his book, Worster uses Cimarron County as an archetype of a dust bowl 
community. In Cimarron, the market value of wheat harvest was $700,000 in 1930, 
$1.2 million in 1931, $7000 in 1932, and $0 in 1933 (out of 200,000 planted acres, 
not a single bushel of wheat was harvested).61 In 1934, only one in four farming 
operations remained debt free.62 Nearly a million people fled their farms in the 
whole Great Plains from 1930 to 1935 and another 2.5 million left in the second half 
of the decade.63 It wasn’t only farmers with crops who were hurting; ranchers also 
faced immense overproduction and low prices. Within the dust bowl, cattle 
frequently dropped dead of ‘dust fever’ (suffocation), and in one county, 90% of the 
chickens died of dust suffocation in 1933. And if their economic woes weren’t 
enough then there were the risk to human health and the casualties of dust 
pneumonia that came with the drought, black blizzards, and daily dusters. The 
worst black blizzards brought with them total blackout – zero visibility – and 
occasionally blinded those who survived stranded outside in the storms.64 In the 
first fifteen days of July 1936, 2,500 people died in the Midwest due to weather 
(some from dust pneumonia, but mostly from heat and drought).65  
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In short, the dust bowl was a both a severe economic and ecological crisis. 
The next section addresses the policy response from Washington prompted by this 
crisis.  
 
Section 3: Policy Response 
 
The agricultural crisis of the 1930s was much more than a crisis of severe 
wind erosion. It was primarily a crisis of oversaturated markets and low farm 
income. The New Deal agricultural policies of the 1930s aimed first of all to address 
the economic crisis, and secondarily, the ecological crisis. To be sure, the two were 
very much intertwined. The ecological crisis was the result of the economic 
circumstances, namely the speculative growth of agriculture in the previous decades 
and the price collapse of the 1930s, and the environmental disasters of the dust 
bowl resulted in further economic woes. Some policies addressing the economic 
crisis (such as planned scarcity and conservation districts) were ecologically helpful, 
but others (price floors and income support) only maintained an agricultural 
economy of overproduction and reassured an economic culture that pushed the land 
beyond its limits.  
In June of 1933, by Executive Order 6084, the tasks of the Federal Farm 
Board were transferred to the new Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the 
name was changed to the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). The FCA refinanced 
farm mortgages at rates more manageable for farmers. Because of its advantageous 
policies for farmers, the FCA essentially became the bank of rural America, 
providing loans at 5% interest, effectively replacing private banks (though many 
rural banks had already gone under).  According to Worster, nothing could have 
been more radical and had it been applied in any other industry, it would have been 
denounced as bolshevism. In its first three years, the FCA loaned more than $600 
million to farmers.66  
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 established the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA) – a more comprehensive replacement to the 
Federal Farm Board. The AAA needed to address the problems farmers were facing 
in an oversaturated market. It did so in two ways: limiting production and providing 
price supports. The AAA authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to offer direct 
payments to farmers in exchange for participation in acreage control programs, for 
‘basic crops’, a long list of traditional cash crops. This meant that farmers would 
receive a check simply for agreeing to plant less than the amount that AAA would 
delegate to each farm, for any given crop, each year. Acreage control payments 
provided the AAA with the means to restrict aggregate production quantities. The 
acreage control programs, they hoped, could solve overproduction in the long run, 
but they still needed to address inadequate farm incomes in the short run. The 
Commodity Credit Corporation was established in order to fix prices at the rate of a 
government provided non-recourse loan with the commodity serving as collateral 
(meaning there was no penalty for failing on the loan besides the government 
keeping the commodities). CCC loans were essentially a price floor at which the 
government would buy crops.  Surplus disposal programs were also heavily utilized, 
paying ranchers to slaughter and paying farmers to burn crops, in order to eliminate 
surplus market supply. 67 
Each commodity program – government assigned acreage allotment in 
return for eligibility for the CCC loans that functioned as a price floor – required a 
vote of approval by whatever individuals produced that commodity. If more than 
one third of votes from producers of each given commodity were against the 
program, it would be nulled.68 Nearly every year, every commodity was approved by 
vote expect for a few instances. One such instance was the in 1933, in preparation of 
1934, the first year of eligibility, when ranchers voted down the beef commodity 
program due to a resentfulness for government intervention and federal aid. 
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Apparently they preferred to live and die by the free market. But as the drought 
worsened, and their livestock were left without feed, ranchers quickly changed their 
minds. First, they asked for import restrictions – despite the fact that imported beef 
was a nearly negligible share of beef in the US market – and then finally asked for 
government aid. From June 1934 to the spring of 1935, the USDA bought 8.3 million 
head of cattle for $111.7 million, becoming the largest cattle owner in the world. The 
poor had canned meat and the government had 2 million hides that they didn’t 
know what to do with.69 Another such vote-down occurred in 1938 with the tobacco 
commodity program. Apparently, tobacco growers were through with being told by 
the AAA how much they were allowed to plant. But after a single growing season of 
rampant overproduction, tobacco growers quickly repented and asked for their 
program back. They were eligible again for the 1939 season and the government 
immediately bought their 1938 surplus before it could do too much harm to the 
domestic market.70 These two notable instances illustrate not only the prideful 
resistance of farmers and ranchers in accepting government aid, but also a 
resistance to dialing back production, and the seemingly never-ending patience and 
mercy of the New Deal agricultural aid. 
Though dusters had been blowing on the southern plains for sometime 
before 1934, ecological conditions had not yet gotten violent enough to draw the 
attention of Washington, which was too preoccupied with the throes of the Great 
Depression. After all, the drought and dust storms did to the southern plains what 
AAA policy makers aimed to do to the agricultural economy; cut back production.71 
It wasn’t until the May 1934 dust storm, which snowed Washington with topsoil 
from the Great Plains, that Roosevelt and his cabinet began work on a ‘drought relief 
package’. The most vociferous call for help from farmers was for water by means of 
dams, irrigation diversions, and deep-water wells. But the federal government had a 
different plan. On June 9th, 1934, at Roosevelt’s request, Congress approved $525 
million for a ‘drought relief package’. $275 was for cattle owners, providing 
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emergency feed loans, and for the purchase and slaughter of livestock, canning and 
distributing the meat to the poor. Another $125 million was for destitute farmers, 
providing jobs in public works and cash income supplements. The remaining $125 
million was used to buy ‘submarginal’ lands from destitute farmers and relocating 
the residents to better environments, and also to create work camps for young men, 
provide seed loans for new crops, and establish a shelterbelt program in an attempt 
to tame the winds. Over the course of the 30s, these programs became staple parts 
of the policy effort toward rehabilitating the dust bowl.72 The same year, the AAA 
government contracts for not planting for the following year became heavily utilized 
by wheat farmers on the plains. Though the policy was mostly unpopular amongst 
farmers who believed it was nonsensical to pay farmers to not work, most took 
what they could get during the enduring drought of the 1930s when they couldn’t 
afford to risk planting.73 
In 1935, the government began funding an emergency ‘listing’ program, 
paying farmers to plow their land into deep broad furrows perpendicular to the 
prevailing winds in order to mitigate wind erosion. Listing programs were widely 
popular with farmers. It had always been within the self-interest of farmers to list 
their land but broke farmers couldn’t afford the gasoline required to list their fields. 
The self-interest of farmers and the goals of government policy were in unison with 
the listing programs making them very popular and successful throughout the dust 
bowl years.74 
Hugh Hammond Bennett, often called ‘Big’ Hugh, is considered the father of 
US soil conservation. In 1903, Bennett began working for the Bureau of Soils within 
the USDA as a soil surveyor, and by 1933 when funding for addressing the 
agricultural crisis became readily available, Bennett had already established himself 
as the recognized expert in the US on soil erosion. In 1933, Bennett became director 
of the Soil Erosion Service (SES), one of many ad hoc New Deal agencies within the 
Department of the Interior. Bennett understood that the implementation of single 
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practices (such as listing or terracing the land, which the government had been 
providing funds for) would never be a successful conservation policy, but that a 
comprehensive program would be needed to address the different conservation 
issues on specific farmland. 75  Funding for the SEC was set to expire in 1935 but 
Secretary of the Interior, Harold LeClair Ickes, had faith in Big Hugh and assigned 
him, along with assistant director of the SEC, Walter C. Lowdermilk, to work on 
drafting the legislation for a permanent and comprehensive soil conservation 
program. But before their plans could come to fruition within the Department of the 
Interior, President Roosevelt made the executive decision to streamline the various 
soil conservation programs that were in effect into one agency within the USDA. The 
consolidation of soil conservation programs within the USDA would require 
congressional approval, and so hearings for the creation of the Soil Conservation 
Service were had throughout March and April of 1935. There was already significant 
political support for the Soil Conservation Service, but it’s legislation was expedited 
by a series of massive black blizzards that brought dust all the way from the 
Midwest to the east coast, occasionally darkening the skies of Washington in 
midday. 76  Congress granted funding for nearly all of his proposed programs and 
with the Soil Conservation Act of 1935, the Soil Conservation Service was born.77   
The Agricultural Adjustment program was the primary tool for the federal 
government to address agricultural overproduction until it was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on January 6th, 1936. The justices’ gripe was 
with the federal tax issued on commercial food producers used to fund the new farm 
support programs.78 With the repeal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the 
Soil Conservation Service became the sole means for addressing overproduction in 
1936. (The AAA was reestablished in 1937). The Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act of 1936 was an amendment to the original 1935 legislation that 
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increased funding for the SCS in order to help the agency carry the weight of farm 
support until a new Agricultural Adjustment program could be passed. Before the 
1936 amendment, the SCS continued on much in the same way as the SES had under 
the department of the interior, providing research demonstrations across the nation 
to show farmers the strategies and benefits of conservation farming, along with the 
Conservation Options Program, which provided technical assistance to farmers who 
wanted to apply the agronomic techniques displayed in the demonstrations. In 
1936, with the amended legislation, the SCS established the Agricultural 
Conservation Program (ACP), essentially the first land retirement program, offering 
payments to farmers for shifting cultivated land from ‘soil depleting’ crops, to ‘soil 
enriching’ ones. However, the job of limiting overproduction proved too big for the 
SCS alone and it failed to orchestrate production limits to the same degree as the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration had. Severe drought in 1936 obscured the 
fact that conservation programs from the 1936 bill were less effective than the AAA 
had been – planting was significantly up in 1936.79  
It took two years of finding their footing and being preoccupied with picking 
up the slack left behind by the repealed AAA before the SCS could begin 
implementing the kind of compressive approach that Bennett had always talked of. 
In February 1937, a model state soil conservation district law was drafted by the 
SCS, which would allow local farmers to organize their own soil conservation 
districts. It was from these districts that conservation practices could transition 
from demonstrations to actual practice on private farms. President FDR wrote to 
every governor with the recommended legislation.80 In 1937, 22 states passed a soil 
conservation law that enabled the creation of local districts, and over time, all 50 
states would create similar laws.81 This policy, therefore, depended heavily on 
community involvement and the local initiative of farmers to implement 
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conservation practices. However, community involvement and localized oversight 
proved more difficult in practice than in theory, and Worster claims that many soil 
conservation districts fell apart due to lack of local initiative.82 However, the 
problem of soil conservation districts failing to coerce farmers into practicing 
conservation agriculture isn’t so much that the soil conservation districts dissolved 
– there are over 3000 soil conservation districts in operation today83 – the 
complications arise because these soil conservation districts rely on voluntary 
conservation compliance. Local oversight might help considerably in convincing 
farmers to implement conservation practice, but these districts still lack the 
authority to coerce farmers into complying if they choose not to do so.84 
Nonetheless, Worster pins the failure of the Soil Conservation Districts as the result 
of farmers’ ideological opposition to government intervention in agriculture, or at 
least they were opposed when it diminished their profits.85 
When the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 was passed, 
about 20,000 government workers were sent to the southern plains in a desperate 
attempt to tame the blowing dunes, the SCS began waging war against the dirt and 
the dust. Operation Dust Bowl aimed to plant a vegetative cover and slow the 
drifting dunes through the use of contour plowing.86 Also, Roosevelt signed 
Executive Order 7028, creating the Resettlement Administration, in order to buy 
back the most marginal lands sold under the Homestead Acts – a profound reversal 
of American frontier policy over the last near-century.87 By 1940, federal 
agricultural support had cost $1.4 billion and was the largest item of the federal 
budget. 88 
A prominent New Dealer, Lewis Cecil Gray, whom Worster praises as an 
insightful conservationist thinker, saw the problem of American land use as the 
result of capitalism, broadly defined as personal economic freedom and unlimited 
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acquisitiveness. Germany, France, England and Denmark had each come to similar 
conclusions and consequently established strict controls over private property in 
agriculture. Gray hoped to organize a similar reform of the American agricultural 
system, to find some ‘intermediate ground’ between unregulated capitalism and 
state owned socialism. 89 This implied the conservative use of privately owned land 
through government regulation.  
Worster frames Gray’s policies in three stages. First, conserving what 
remained of the public domain – the end of homesteading.  The Taylor Grazing Act 
of 1934 set aside 80 million acres of grassland toward this end. Second were the 
sub-marginal land purchases. Formally the ‘Land Utilization Project’, the federal 
government aimed in 1934 to buy back 74 million acres of unprofitable and 
ecologically damaged land. At its conclusion in 1947, only 11.3 million acres had 
been bought. Third, conservation needed to apply on privately owned land – the 
most important and most difficult step. The goal was to entice farmers into 
voluntarily acting within society’s long-term interests, but it was also necessary to 
establish coercion against uncooperative farmers. In this original attempt for 
conservation compliance, uncooperative farmers were to be coerced by their peers 
through community involvement in Soil Conservation Committee. Gray was 
philosophically committed to achieving conservation compliance with small-scale 
community land oversight - decentralized county planning committees. Committees 
were to be established at both the state and county levels. By the end of the 30s two-
thirds of the nation’s counties had such committees. But after Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry Wallace left the position in 1941, the county committees quickly 
dissolved. Worster blames their dissolution on the Farm Bureau (an affiliation of 
farmers), land-grant extensions agents, and others with commercial interests in 
farming more land, with fewer regulations. With the loss of the grassroots soil 
conservation committees went the most important mechanism for establishing 
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Gray’s vision of some ‘intermediate ground,’ which could reconcile private 
enterprise and soil conserving agriculture.90  
The Future of the Great Plains (1936) provides a valuable summary of the 
New Deal conservation thinking (and how theory was subverted by political 
limitations in practice). The report was authored by a committee of eight persons, 
representing four different agencies, each with a different view on the matter – 
Worster claims its principal author was Lewis Gray.91 The report stated, radically, 
that land destruction was the result of our cultural attitudes – namely the “that man 
conquers nature,” “that natural resources are inexhaustible,” “that habitual practices 
are best,” that what is good for the individual is good for everybody”, “that an owner 
may do with his property as he likes,” “that expanding markets will continue 
indefinitely”, and “that free competition coordinates industry and agriculture”.92 By 
challenging the justifications and feasibility of private enterprise in agriculture, this 
section of the report seems to suggest that far-reaching changes within the 
agricultural economy were required, yet somehow, the conclusions of the report fell 
far short. Instead, the report blamed land degradation of the plains as the result of 
farmers applying humid agricultural practices onto an arid land.93 Such a conclusion 
implied the possibility of an agronomic/technical solution, not the necessary 
cultural revisions. The solutions proposed included lager farm units, the purchase of 
sub-marginal lands, cooperative grazing associations, soil conservation districts, 
farm loans conditioned on approved farming practices, country zoning to protect 
highly erodible lands, consolidation of governments into more effective units, tax 
relief during drought, and a permanent dust bowl agency to implement all of this.94 
The application of these policies helped mitigate soil loss and land degradation to a 
degree, but against the pressure of expansionary commercial agriculture, US 
agricultural policy fell far short of an adequate solution. The 30s proved a mere 
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momentary lapse in our growth culture; soon the memories and lessons of the black 





There are many various links in the causal chain of the dust bowl, but 
Worster provides a persuasive argument that ‘capitalist’ values are a common 
element for each contributing cause of the dust bowl. 
Blaming the dust bowl on a freakishly extended drought implicitly pardons 
farmers and others with interests in commercial agriculture, because it implies the 
event occurred by no human fault. Worster makes clear that although drought was a 
necessary cause, it was not a sufficient one. Droughts have come and gone through 
the southern plains for millennia without such a disaster. Tree ring evidence in 
Nebraska has shown the semi-regularity of extended droughts, including one lasting 
26 years in the 16th century.96 The destruction of the native sod, in favor of 
cultivated land combined with drought and high winds (common occurrences on the 
southern plains) physically created the dust bowl 97 – not drought alone.  
The economic and political forces that contributed to the destruction of 
native sod in an area ill-suited for agriculture were the advent of industrial 
technology, Jeffersonian public policy (Homestead Acts), and capitalistic growth 
culture. Worster discounts the independent roles of both industrial technology and 
the Homestead Acts by arguing that each contributed to the dust bowl only because 
they occurred within a capitalistic growth culture. 
The film, “The Plow That Broke the Plains” (1936), made by Pare Lorentz for 
the Farm Security Administration, blamed the dust bowl on the advent of industrial 
machinery, yet paradoxically concluded that the same technology could be utilized 
responsibly, post-New Deal. And so Worster argues, the more fundamental cause of 
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the dust bowl was the kind of farming practiced with this machinery, or even more 
fundamentally, the cultural values determining those farming practices. He writes, 
“The attitude of capitalism – industrial and pre-industrial – toward the earth was 
imperial and commercial; none of its ruling values taught environmental humility, 
reverence, or restraint. This was the cultural impetus that drove Americans into the 
grassland and determined the way they would use it.”98 Worster argues that the 
advent of the tractor and industrial farm machinery in the early 20th century were 
never pure technological advances in practice, but were only ever technological 
advances in the hands of a commercialized society. Technological advancement in 
itself could never have led to the dust bowl. Instead, industrial capitalism – 
mechanized process combined with investment, for a profit, led to the dust bowl. 99 
Although the Homestead Acts and the related Jeffersonian ideals of an 
expansionary agriculturally based democracy were necessary causes for the 
creation of the dust bowl, Worster blames the capitalist ethos as more fundamental. 
One might argue that Jeffersonian ideals are responsible for the dust bowl in the 
same way as the capitalist ethos; they were both underlying cultural values. And just 
as the capitalist ethos is problematic in it’s drive for growth and disregard for 
ecological limits, Jeffersonian ideals would evolve over the 19th and 20th centuries 
into a cultural attitude of expansionary optimism, occasionally spouting pure lunacy, 
assuming that rain would follow the plow and that there exist no deserts, only lands 
not yet tamed by man.100 It was this misplaced confidence in westward settlement 
that resulted in a severe imbalance between the farmer and the ecology of the 
plains. The Homestead Acts (of 1862 and the enlarged version in 1909 that made 
available the southern plains) were entirely Jeffersonian and without this land 
policy, the surge of settlement and destruction of the native sod between 1910 and 
1930 would not have occurred nearly so rapidly.101 In this sense, the Homestead 
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Acts were the greatest political force that contributed to the dust bowl. However, 
Worster diminishes the blame on Jeffersonian ideals, stating,  
 
Both [Jefferson’s expansionary democracy and capitalism] were expressions 
of the same self-minded, individualistic dynamism that ignored complex 
ecological realities. But the capitalist ethos was by far the more important, 
for it replaced man’s attachments to the earth, which Jefferson still cherished, 
with an all out dedication to cash, it replaced a rural economy aimed at 
sufficiency with one driving toward unlimited wealth.102 
 
Had Jeffersonian ideals of an agricultural democracy been present in a society 
without the capitalist ethos, the speculative commercial growth in agriculture that 
led to the dust bowl would never have occurred. 
Droughts had occurred many times on the southern plains without ecological 
catastrophe; it was only once settlers exchanged the native sod for cultivated 
acreage that the dust bowl became possible. Native sod was quickly exchanged for 
cash crops because the commercial agriculture of America in the early 20th century 
possessed the advent of industrial agricultural technology and the still growing 
legacy of Jeffersonian land policy.  Thus, Worster comes to the conclusion that the 
fundamental cause of the dust bowl was commercial agriculture. Commercial 
agriculture is a manifestation of capitalistic culture, driven primarily by a desire for 
extracting greater wealth from the soil. The dust bowl was not a freak 
environmental disaster that unexpectedly and unavoidably wrought disaster upon 
the Great Plains, but was instead the predictable result of an American capitalist 
culture upon the land, which promoted ecologically destructive farming practices.103  
To be clear, blaming cultural values greatly diminishes the blame on 
individual farmers within that culture. If the problem was the individualistic 
expansionary growth culture, then the US agricultural market was simply an 
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expression of this culture, and farmers, the individual producers, were merely 
performing the functions of the market. Individual farmers were responding to the 
market, which was trending towards larger and more efficient farming, while 
overproduction pushed farmers into expanding the farm in order to stay financially 
solvent. Short run market forces dominated the decision making of farmers. There 
was certainly an element of greed and shortsightedness, but it wasn’t as if urbanites 
were any more constrained in their commercialism during this era. Worster sees the 
simultaneous events of the dust bowl and the Wall Street collapse as products of a 
common cause: “a common economic culture, in factories and on farms, based on 
unregulated private capital seeking its own unlimited increase.”104 Individual 
farmers became little more than cogs in the wheel of US and international markets.  
Worster’s Dust Bowl is an explicit argument that the capitalistic values of 
American culture caused the dust bowl. In contrast, Timothy Egan’s book, The Worst 
Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American Dust Bowl is 
less of an argument for what really caused the dust bowl (though he takes up that 
question as well), but more of a defense of those who lived through the dust bowl. 
Revealing the personal accounts of various farmers and rural communities, Egan 
makes it clear how “settlers lacked both the knowledge and the incentive necessary” 
to avoid the mistakes which led to the dust bowl. Egan identified the Homestead 
Acts, technological changes and speculative agricultural investments, as the 
institutional forces, which led to the dust bowl. More land was continuously plowed 
up into the 1930s, first incentivized by high grain prices from increased wartime 
demand during WWI, then by increased production capacity from mechanized farm 
equipment. As oversupply ensued and prices dropped, individuals were incentivized 
to produce more in order to cover their operating costs and pay off mortgages on 
new machinery. In 1929, farmers needed, on average, three times the biggest 
allotted homestead in order to simply cover operating costs.105 When the market 
became oversaturated, it was economical for farmers to leave fields uncultivated, 
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bare and susceptible to wind erosion. In these ways, individual farmers were 
reactionaries to larger institutional forces, not the primary causes of the dust 
bowl.106  
Worster provides a compelling theory for why the dust bowl happened, but 
on the topic of alternatives or solutions, his direction is vague and a bit muddled. To 
do so, as a historian, would be more than is expected of him, yet simultaneously, it 
feels unfair to argue against commercial agriculture without providing some 
suggested alternative. Of course he suggests a revision of cultural values, but exactly 
what that looks like is left very vague – some ‘intermediate ground’ between 
unregulated capitalism and socialist state-owned agriculture. Although he quotes 
Karl Marx’s, Capital in the epigraph of his introduction - “All progress in capitalistic 
agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the laborer, but of robbing 
the soil” - Worster is not a Marxist himself. In the afterword of the 2004 edition of 
Dust Bowl he writes, “I never intended… to offer a ‘Marxist’ interpretation of Great 
Plains history, for after all, Marx missed quite a few things and turned out to be a 
bad prophet.”107  
Worster distances himself from the philosophy of Karl Marx primarily 
because he appears unwilling to entirely abandon the system of private property in 
agriculture. I think this is why he evokes Lewis Gray, the New Dealer who hoped to 
salvage privately owned commercial agriculture through careful government 
oversight. Unlike any other person in his historical account, Worster frames Gray in 
a very positive light, as an especially forward thinker in his time. But Worster also 
suggests that Gray’s intermediate ground between capitalism and socialism became 
too moderate to be wholly effective; it failed to establish any real control over the 
industry in terms of stemming its commercial drive for growth. This was proven 
when commercial interests from within overcame the decentralized, county soil 
conservation committees. Worster recognizes the influence and ability of private 
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capitalistic competition to derail obstacles in the way of financial growth. By 
pointing out the shortcoming’s of Gray’s policy’s, Worster implies that in order for 
this ‘intermediate ground’ to be successful, it must be more aggressively anti-free-
market than what the New Deal established. In my opinion, Worster is necessarily 
vague on alternatives and solutions, because from his stance - that capitalist values 
must go – the logical solution is the dissolution of private capital in agriculture, a 
step that he is not willing to take. 
There are important lessons that can be drawn from the dust bowl years and 
agricultural policy in the 1930s; lessons that can be applied toward practical policy 
solutions in the 21st century. One such lesson is that farmers will often prove 
defensive and resistant to policy reform. There were two kinds of defensiveness 
from farming during the dust bowl: defensiveness for the sake of the whole industry 
and status quo, and defensiveness for the sake of personal fault and responsibility. 
 During the dust bowl farmers became defensive about modern agriculture in 
general and its common practices.  As evidence mounted that their agricultural 
practices were not in harmony with the environment, many farmers clung to the 
belief that their way of farming was unproblematic. The farmers of the southern 
plains were optimists: optimistic that dry land farming would be successful; 
optimistic for one’s own land and a faith that its produce would send them up the 
social ladder; optimistic that the land existed only for their cultivation, that there 
would be no consequence for destroying the natural ecology; optimistic that 
tomorrow would always bring greater riches. The black blizzards seriously 
challenged such optimism and contradicted the plainsmen’s thinking; nature would 
not yield unlimited riches so easily. How did farmers respond to such a challenge? 
Worster says, “Changes in attitudes did occur, to be sure, but the most incredible 
fact of the dirty thirties was the tenacity of bourgeois optimism and its 
imperviousness to all warnings.”108 The black blizzards suggested that the southern 
plains were no place for farming. People are never so eager to accept that their way 
of life is flawed. Worster generalizes the progression of local attitudes as: never 
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anticipating a serious drought during settlement, underestimating the seriousness 
of the drought once it started (keeping faith in a better tomorrow), denying its 
seriousness and defending the value of their home region, asking for limited help, 
but then demanding federal aid quickly when and where they want it without 
strings attached, supporting only optimistic politicians and ever denying the need 
for radical reform, and grudgingly accepting the aid that is given while bitterly 
awaiting the day when the plains are ‘normal’ and prosperous again.109 Farmers in 
the 1930s never wanted reform, only ‘relief’. Worster frames it as a matter of pride. 
‘Relief’ implied they had done no wrong but were simply overcome by some natural 
disaster. Worster writes, “Intense pride in themselves and their achievements, 
which is the natural emotion of a frontier community, nonetheless required that the 
asking be severely constrained: there was to be no confession of failure; work was 
infinitely preferable to the dole; relief was to be only a temporary arrangement.”110 
The dust bowl also illustrated a personal defensiveness in response to blame. 
If the defensiveness of farmers for their industry in general was ever overcome, 
there was also a personal defensiveness against any blame for the dust bowl or for 
the fracture between agriculture and ecology. Not just for farmers, but also for every 
individual immediately responsible for some questionable industry practice, there 
will always be this kind of personal defensiveness. If Egan’s argument is accepted, 
the personal defensiveness of farmers during the 1930s was legitimate. Farmers 
were primarily reactionaries, sailing in the direction of the economic winds, 
performing their function as commercially competitive units. In this sense, none the 
individuals were fundamentally responsible. But ‘bailing out’ the whole industry 
because the individuals appear innocent becomes practically complicated, because 
of the long run consequences. Providing relief and implementing policies that 
salvaged US agriculture in the 1930s was like a patch-job on broken or 
fundamentally flawed system. Private enterprise was still far from internalizing the 
externalities of its practices and respecting ecological limits. Also, it seems unfair to 
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always pawn off the responsibility of farmers to greater institutional incentives – 
maybe farmers who were still plowing virgin lands in 1930s weren’t really so guilty 
because they were desperately trying to avoid bankruptcy, but what about the land 
grant agents and farmers who were antagonistic towards Dr. Gray’s localized soil 
conservation committees in the 1940s? Where does personal accountability come 
into play? For the practicality of policy makers, often it does not.  
Both kinds of defensiveness (for the status quo of farming, and for personal 
responsibility) are unsurprising. Whether its farmers in the 1930s, or today, people 
tend to not like to be told how to farm by the government. This contradicts their 
political ideals of American economic liberty.  Bennett, Gray, and the other New Deal 
conservationists aimed to construct a conservation oversight system that would be 
amenable with these ideals of American economic liberty through the use of 
voluntary soil conservation districts. The idea was that coercing farmers into 
implementing conservation on private land wasn’t an appropriate role for the 
federal government, and that locally run committees would be better suited for 
conservation oversight. Even on the local scale, voluntary conservation compliance 
failed to include every private farm in the way that Bennett’s ideal comprehensive 
conservation program would, or in the way that Dr. Gray’s intermediate ground 
hoped to do. The dust bowl illustrates how people generally resist when the 
government, or their peers, tells them precisely how to farm. For this reason, tax 
incentives should be a more practical policy than conservation compliance through 
unpopular, subjective, and corruptible localized oversight. With a soil erosion tax, 
farmers are free to be defensive and continue their way of farming if they wish, but 
will pay higher taxes accordingly. 
Another important lesson to be learned from the dust bowl is that farmers, 
like everyone, follow the path of economic incentives. Indeed, there are exceptions, 
where farmers choose to implement costly conservation practices for the sake of 
good stewardship. But such approbation should not be expected. Whether this is an 
eternal fact, or limited to our capitalistic culture is irrelevant for the purpose of this 
thesis. The revision of our cultural values, to suddenly remove profit-seeking 
 40 
behavior from agriculture, is a highly impractical political solution, despite whether 
or not it is ideal.  
The problem of how to incentivize conservation has been around since the 
SCS began demonstrations in the 1930s. For these demonstrations, the SCS would 
buy or rent out eroding land from farmers, then bring in the experts who would 
implement all of the available conservation measures for reducing erosion: contour 
cultivation, strip cropping, terracing, stopping gullies, etc. The SCS then advertised 
around the area – come see and learn how to make a conservation plan for your own 
farm. The demonstration projects certainly helped promote awareness and 
exposure of conservation farming, but they did little for the actual implementation 
of these practices on private farms. Individual farmers were busy with their own 
farm, and not eager to take on additional conservation projects that required 
expensive heavy machinery and technical expertise that most farmers lacked.111 
This is the fundamental challenge of conservation policy: how to apply conservation 
onto privately owned land. Clearly, demonstrations alone were not enough, and so 
the policies of the SCS quickly evolved into incentivizing land retirement and the 
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) was created. Then, the SCS implemented 
the grassroots democratic system of soil conservation districts in order to promote 
local involvement and support. This system has proved effective at increasing 
farmers’ involvement in conservation, to a degree, but it relies on voluntary 
involvement and there is still no means for coercing farmers that choose, often for 
financial reasons, not to practice the most advanced conservation agriculture.  
The simple fact is that farmers and agribusiness are profit-seeking producers 
in the market. If the political impracticality of legislation that totally defies or 
constrains the economic interests of farmers has not already become apparent from 
examining the dust bowl, a brief examination of modern farm policy since then in 
Part B of this essay, will reinforce the fact that policies enacted by US Congress 
almost always are within the financial interests of farmers. US farm policy has 
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historically been a policy of providing economic security, and also global advantage 
to US farmers. Existing conservation policies certainly utilize incentives, but they do 
so in a piecemeal way and are often underfunded. A soil erosion tax could prove a 
more effective and streamlined policy for incentivizing conservation practices. 
The history of the dust bowl illustrates the reality and even law-like nature of 
economic competition. The conservation policies of the 1930s fell short of 
conditioning agriculture in equilibrium with the ecology primarily because of 
economic competition. Karl Marx didn’t believe that a revolution of the proletariat 
was possible on a local level, because wherever such a revolution happened, it 
would be at an economic disadvantage to whatever neighboring nation squeezed 
the maximum productivity out of its land and labor. That is why he rallied for the 
workers of the world unite, because he could think of no defense against more 
industrial and productive societies. Economic competition is the modern mode of 
nature’s law. Be fit or die; be price competitive or go bankrupt. Economies of scale 
are a reality, and there are propensities for agricultural units of industrial efficiency. 
The drive for commercial competition tends to ignore obstacles to short-run profit, 
such as ecological limits and long run externalities. The tenacity of private 
competition to always grow in wealth is difficult to stem. And when the nation 
drives ever onward in economic growth, how can the farmer not be expected to do 
the same? To paraphrase George Steinbeck from the Grapes of Wrath, ‘When the 
monster stops growing it dies. It can’t stay one size.’ 
Worster reinforces this idea of economic competition as the modern law of 
nature and the pioneers of industry dragging everyone else along behind them. He 
does so especially when he highlights another wind erosion disaster that occurred 
in the late 50s and early 60s in the USSR. Food production had been falling behind 
demand and so Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, ordered the collectivist farms 
to plow 40 million hectares of semi arid grasslands. Droughts soon lead to wind 
erosion, damaging 17 million acres. His decision led to widespread criticism for his 
disregard of the local ecology. In his defense he wrote, “Put Comrade Barayev [the 
critic] into conditions of capitalistic competition and his farm, with its present 
system of plantings, probably would not survive. Could he ever compete with a large 
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capitalist farm if he keeps 32 percent of his plowed land in cleaned fallow?”112 There 
is a propensity for agricultural practices that are most immediately productive, 
regardless of long-run sustainability. If markets become oversupplied from too 
much production, prices will drop and farm units that produce relatively less – 
perhaps because they behave responsibly by alternating cultivation with clean 
fallows instead of using chemical fertilizers, consequently reaping smaller profits – 
are the first to go bankrupt on the crash course to market equilibrium. The tendency 
of the market to reward price competitiveness and ignore ecological externalities is 
why the authors of, A History of World Agriculture, concerned with the ecological 
trajectory of global agriculture and land degradation, call for the end of the 
“international agricultural price war.”113 Arguably, agriculture is a unique industry 
and we cannot afford to be swayed by the whims of price competition when it is the 
livelihood of farmers and the soil resources of all consumers at stake. 
Ultimately, the dust bowl illustrates the paradigm between private 
enterprise in agriculture and ecological limits. Individual farmers in the market 
react to short run market forces in ways that often ignore long run ecological 
externalities such as soil erosion. An appropriate policy response to the dilemma of 
how to address conservation practices on privately owned land is that of Lewis 
Gray; aiming to establish some intermediate ground between unregulated 
capitalism and state owned socialism. State owned socialism might be undesirable 
for some ideological reasons, but it is appealing because the central authority could 
then easily regulate land use without worrying about violating the ownership rights 
of farmers and landowners. Unregulated capitalism is appealing in the sense that it 
the path of least political resistance; farmers in the US generally prefer to go 
unregulated. Gray sought to establish an intermediate ground between the two by 
establishing conservation compliance through localized community oversight. This 
method for coercion proved ineffective in practice, as there was never enough local 
political support and the committees eventually dissolved. Worster suggests that 
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Gray’s intermediate ground failed because it was too moderate, too close to 
unregulated capitalism, but really, it failed because it was not a pragmatic policy 
approach, it depended upon local grassroots involvement, something there was no 
political momentum for. It isn’t that we need an intermediate ground that is more 
liberal, or more conservative – we need a conservation policy that accepts the 
political climate and implements a policy that does not require active grassroots 
political involvement. A soil erosion tax would be successful where voluntary 
conservation compliance has failed, because its implementation does not rely on the 




Agricultural Policy Reform: The Argument for a Soil Erosion Tax 
 
 Practicing agriculture has always been an ecological challenge. The first 
section of Part B will examine a brief account of the failed agricultures of expired 
civilizations, and then examine the ‘permanence’ of modern agriculture. To be sure, 
the practice of agriculture often leads to land degradation generally. Soil is a 
complex resource and its degradation often comes in the form of soil organic matter 
(SOM) loss, increased salinity, acidification, nutrient depletion, and the decline of 
microbial activity. However, for the practicality of this essay, the ‘permanence’ of 
agriculture is weighed in terms of soil erosion. How much soil volume is retained 
under the practice of agriculture? Following the archeological account of failed 
agricultures, the rest of Section One examines our current understanding of soil 
formation rates and soil erosion rates – the improved understanding of each is 
fundamental to accurately gauging the sustainability of ongoing farming practices. 
Section One concludes by pointing out farming practices that improve soil erosion 
and soil formation rates. The greater implementation of these conservation 
practices must be the end-goal of any government conservation policy. 
 Before moving on to the policy suggestions of Section Three, Section Two 
lays out a brief history of US farm policy. The history of modern US farm policy 
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reinforces some of the lessons from the dust bowl, and also illustrates the purpose, 
as well as the necessity and complexity of US agricultural policy. Understanding the 
failed attempts of conservation policies in the past and the general role that farm 
policy plays is critical in order to justify any agricultural policy for the present and 
future.  
 Section Three of Part B then lays out the prescribed policy solutions towards 
reconciling the fracture between private enterprise farming and ecological limits. A 
soil erosion tax is a practical means for incentivizing the greater implementation of 
conservation practices in order to improve soil erosion and formation rates to that 
of a permanent agriculture. Section Two shows that the traditional approach of 
conservation policy has been a mostly ineffective paradigm and warrants a new 
approach. Therefore, I argue that conservation policy ought to employ a Pigouvian 
Tax strategy in order to internalize the externalities of soil erosion. Section Three 
examines the practicality and ramifications of such a soil erosion tax.  
 
 
Section 1: A Permanent Agriculture 
 
1.1 US Farming in an Archeological Context: Another Attempt at a Permanent 
Agriculture 
Agriculture has always been a precarious endeavor. The dangers of 
accelerated soil erosion due to agriculture have been recognized since at least the 
time of Plato and Aristotle.114 Many more recent studies suggest a strong association 
between soil erosion and the decline of civilizations.115 In 1938 and 1939, Walter 
Clay Lowdermilk, Assistant Director of the USDA Soil Conservation Service and 
colleague of ‘Big’ Hugh Bennett, surveyed the lands of England, Holland, France, 
Italy, North Africa, and the Near East, in the interests of learning from the history of 
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others and establishing a permanent agriculture in our relatively young nation.116 
Lowdermilk’s account of the history of agriculture, soil erosion and the decline of 
civilizations, specifically in the Near East (today this is Israel, Syria and Lebanon) 
are especially haunting, and his broad analysis of agriculture extremely insightful.  
Lowdermilk saw the world with the eyes of an agricultural archeologist 
reading the stories of ancient civilizations written on the land. He believed that the 
partnership between farmers and the land is the rock foundation for every 
civilization. Efficient agriculture was the birth of human civilization, for once food is 
produced without demanding all available labor, individuals begin to specialize in 
various crafts, and exchange the goods they produce for food instead. And as food 
production becomes more labor efficient, the division of labor continues to develop 
into that of a complex civilization. 117 In accredit of modern civilization and its rock-
foundation, modern agriculture is indeed extremely labor efficient. In 2006, a 
common industrialized American farm operates at an average of 480 
acres/worker/year.118  
Lowdermilk noted that throughout human civilization, failures in 
establishing a permanent agriculture have been more frequent than successes.119 
Archeologists believe that the birth of human civilization happened approximately 
7000 years ago in the fertile plains of Mesopotamia and the Valley of the Nile where 
irrigation and tilling allowed for more efficient agriculture. On Mesopotamia, 
Lowdermilk writes,  
For at least 11 empires have risen and fallen in this tragic land in 7,000 years. 
It is a story of a precarious agriculture practiced by people who lived and 
grew up under the threat of raids and invasions from the denizens of 
grasslands and the desert, and of the failure of their irrigation canals because 
of silt.120 
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Muddy irrigation canals would slow their flow over time due to the build up of 
sediment. As these irrigation canals expanded into vast systems, it required an ever-
greater labor force to keep the canals from choking up with silt. The ruling empires 
kept slaves for the task of digging out the canals, such as the biblical Israelites: “By 
the rivers of Babylon we sat and wept when we remembered Zion.” (Psalm 137:1). 
Unlike other failed agricultures around the world, the decline of Mesopotamia was 
not due to soil loss from erosion, but instead the fragile irrigation system proved 
their demise when wars or other disruptions took place. Lowdermilk posited that, 
“Mesopotamia is capable of supporting as great a population as it ever did and 
greater when modern engineering makes use of reinforced concrete construction 
for irrigation works and powered machinery to keep canal systems open.”121 
Similarly, Lowdermilk suggested that farming in the Valley of the Nile has remained 
suitable for about 6000 years because soil erosion has been essentially a null issue – 
the annual flooding of the river spreads thin layers of silt from the uplands over the 
valley depositing new fertile soil.  
Lowdermilk contrasts the relatively successful agricultures of the Nile and 
Mesopotamian river valleys (ancient farmland that still contains fertile soil) with the 
more mountainous lands of Israel, Syria and Lebanon. His survey of the land of Sinai, 
where Moses and his Israelites supposedly wandered with their herds of grazing 
animals for 40 years, found the epitome of desolation by accelerated soil erosion. 
Brown hillsides had been severely eroded into deep ephemeral gullies, often down 
to rock.  
Throughout Israel, Lowdermilk found that the land of milk and honey had 
been degraded over the centuries. The red soil of the area has washed away in many 
places down to bedrock. Agriculture is still practiced in the valleys where the soil 
has washed into, but with every hard rain, more soil flows away through great 
ephemeral gullies. In the sloping lands around Jerusalem, agriculture remained 
practiced in the areas where large stonewalls formed terraces to prevent erosion. 
                                                        
121 Lowdermilk, Conquest of the Land Through Seven Thousand Years, 5.  
 47 
However, even where these careful practices have been implemented, the damage of 
thousands of years of grazing and cultivation is clear.122 
In Syria and Jordan, Lowdermilk found even greater desolation and evidence 
that the agriculture of an ancient civilization had worn upon the land until the soil 
was utterly exhausted, marking the expiration and desertification of their once 
bountiful land. He writes, 
 
Still farther to the north in Syria, we came upon a region where erosion had 
done its worst in an area of more than a million acres of rolling limestone 
country between Hama, Aleppo, and Antioch. French archaeologists, Father 
Mattern, and others found in this man-made desert more than 100 dead 
cities.123 
 
The scattered ruins of these small cities suggest that this land was once fertile, until 
overgrazing or excessive tilling resulted in extreme soil erosion, decimating the 
civilization of these hill-peoples.  
Lowdermilk also examined similar stories of success and failure in North 
Africa and Europe, and then looked towards the application of learned lessons in the 
US. Essentially, Lowdermilk found that where there are slopes, erosion eventually 
compromises the ability to practice agriculture. In 1953, he warned of the path on 
which we were (and still are) trending. He said, because most of our land is 
somewhat sloped, approximately 300 million acres of our 400 some-million acres of 
US farmland were eroding faster than soil was being formed. He admitted that we 
have not yet found a solution to soil erosion but that the application of certain soil 
conservation practices, like leaving a layer crop residue to cover the soil, can 
improve our rates of soil erosion. In the words of Lowdermilk, “Here clearly is our 
objective for a permanent agriculture, namely, to safeguard the physical body of the 
soil resource and to keep down erosion wastage under cultivation as nearly as 
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possible to this geologic norm of erosion under natural vegetation.”124 The policy 
recommendations of this essay maintain this same objective. 
 
1.2 A Tolerable Rate of Soil Loss 
 
More than half a century since Lowdermilk’s report, soil erosion rates have 
improved, but agriculture in the US remains far from ‘permanent’. One can simplify 
the issue with the following mathematical expression:125 
Tc = S/( E – F ) 
Where: Tc = critical time, S = initial soil thickness, E = soil erosion rate, 
F = soil formation rate 
 
A permanent agriculture would operate with an erosion rate equivalent to the 
formation rate – we can only afford to lose soil at the rate it is renewed. Establishing 
a permanent agriculture then requires data on both the erosion rates under 
cultivation, and the rate of soil formation in order to balance our E-value against our 
F-value. The problem is that there is an extreme dearth of data necessary for 
estimating each value and for determining a tolerable rate of soil loss. 
 
1.3 Soil Formation Rates 
 
The contemporary literature is extremely muddled in its references when it 
comes to soil formation. Leonard C. Johnson comically points that most authors 
today cite David Pimentel et al. “Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy 
Resources” (1976) on the rate of soil formation, but Pimentel et al. in fact cited 
David Hudson (1971)126 (Pimentel and Hudson were fellow professors at Cornell), 
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who in turn referenced ‘Big’ Hugh Bennett’s magnum opus, Soil Conservation. 127 
Bennett’s values were admittedly speculations. Pimentel et al. also cited others who, 
Johnson argues were of little significance to Pimentel’s conclusion that soil is formed 
under natural conditions at a rate of 1 inch every 300 to 1000 years.128  Hudson then 
made the references entirely circular in 1981 when the republished edition of 
Hudson’s work cited Pimentel et al. (1976), no longer Bennett (1939) as the source 
for his soil formation estimates. Pimentel became the go-to expert on soil formation 
estimates for some and has consequently been discredited by others as an alarmist 
and for purporting to know what no one knows. 129   
Despite a lack of data, the USDA estimated the rate of soil formation in the 
1950s, following the concerns of farmers, the SCS and men like Lowdermilk and 
Bennett. The established soil loss tolerance levels became known as ‘T-values’. T-
values supposedly represent the rate of soil formation and therefore the tolerable 
rate of soil loss for a permanent and sustainable agriculture. Generally, soil 
conservation programs establish T values at 5 – 12 tons/hectares/year - equivalent 
to .4 to 1 mm/year of erosion (assuming a soil bulk density of 1.2g/cm3).130 T-values 
are assigned site specifically and are dependent on the soil depth.131 If these T-
values are supposed to stand for the rate of soil erosion that is equivalent to soil 
formation, the claim is that soil forms 1 inch every 25.4 to 63.7 years. The accuracy 
of these T-values, as well as the economic and political motivations behind their 
establishment, has been highly contested.132  
David Montgomery of the University of Washington finds in his 2007 study 
that in fact, T-values are roughly ten times greater than the rate of soil 
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production.133 Montgomery admits the contentions of soil scientists on this topic 
have so far remained compromised by a lack of data and so he compiled 201 various 
different studies over recent years (excluding most sediment yield studies, which he 
finds an inaccurate method for estimating soil erosion) and attempts to empirically 
ground some general claims about soil erosion and formation. Montgomery’s data 
supports the claims that geological erosion rates and the soil formation rates are 
indeed roughly equal on non-cultivated land, except in very steep terrain where the 
geological erosion rate is higher. Therefore, most terrain can sustain a certain layer 
of topsoil overtime. His results found that gentle slopes (“cratons”) have geological 
erosion rates between .0001 to .01 mm/year (3.94 x 10-6 to .000394 inches/year), 
moderate slopes (“soil-mantled terrain”) have geological erosion rates between .001 
and 1 mm/year (3.94 x 10-5 to .0394 inches/year), and that steep slopes (“alpine”) 
have geological erosion rates between .1 and >10 mm/year (.00394 to >.394 
inches/year).  
However, classifying soil formation rates in respect to terrain, slope, and 
geological erosion rates alone ignores many of the fundamental aspects of soil 
formation. The University of Minnesota Extension website lists the following as the 
five soil-forming factors: 1) parent material, that is the original geologic material 
from which the soil is formed; 2) climate; 3) the slope and terrain; 4) The organisms 
that live on or in the soil; 5) The duration during which the other four elements have 
interacted.134 And so soil formation rates not only contingent upon the slope and 
terrain, but also (perhaps more fundamentally) contingent upon the parent 
material, climate, and living organisms involved. For the decision making of farmers 
already operating on some given land, the geologic parent material and climate are 
relatively unchangeable135, and so arguably the most important factor of farmers 
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and policy makers to adjust and improve soil formation rates is factor four, the 
organisms that live on or in the soil.  
The fourth soil-forming factor refers to the microscopic ecosystem of 
microorganisms and the plant material that grows from the soil, as well as the 
insects, worms, and burrowing animals that live in that ecosystem. In a forest, the 
soil formation rate depends on the decomposition of the forest litter. In a cultivated 
field, the soil formation rate depends on the decomposition of crop litter. The soil 
formation rate of any given field is dependent on the crop residue management 
practices, however crop residue like corn-stover has economic value as an animal 
forage source136 or as a biofuel feedstock137. So every corn farmer must decide how 
much corn-stover to keep on the field as a crop litter in order to renew soil biomass 
and organic matter, and how much to harvest for forage and feedstock. Richard Hess 
and Doug Karlen et al. take up the feedstock question, concerned about the loss of 
SOM but recognizing the reality of market forces, which incentivize farmers into 
selling their corn-stover to ethanol producers. They conclude that sustainable corn-
stover removal rates, that is, the amount of crop litter necessary to maintain a 
healthy SOM and prevent soil erosion, are usually below 40% of total corn-stover.138 
But regardless of market forces, it’s important to recognize the role that crop 
residue plays by preserving SOM and contributing to general soil health. 
Conservation farming must not only consider how to lower the rates of soil erosion, 
but also how to increase the rates of soil formation.   
 
1.4 Soil Erosion Rates 
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The USDA has made progress over the past several decades in estimating the 
rates of soil erosion on agricultural land. Although previous attempts had been 
made in the early 20th century to express the association between land topography 
and soil erosion (by water), it wasn’t until the 1965 that the USDA developed the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE).139 This equation was revised by Wischmeir and 
Smith again in 1978, and significantly revised in 1997, creating the Revised 
Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE). Although the 1997 revision improved 
estimates, there were shortcomings to the methodology that limited its applicability. 
USLE and RUSLE equations did very poorly in the short run, because they did not 
consider soil depositions. A new kind of soil erosion estimate was developed by 
Flanagan and Nearing of the USDA throughout the 1980s, and finally in 1995, the 
Water Erosion Prediction Project was documented and validated.140 WEPP 
improved upon previous models because of its attention to detail - it includes 
factors for plant growth, residue management and decomposition rates, water 
balance (snow, snowmelt, soil saturation), weather generation, tillage, rill and 
interrill soil detachment, sediment transport and deposition and sediment particle 
size distribution.141 RUSLE has recently been revised again so that the most recent 
evolution of this model is RUSLE 2.142 
The Iowa Daily Erosion Project (IDEP) is an ongoing collaboration of 
scientists at Iowa State University, USDA’s National Soil Erosion Research Lab, 
USDA’s National Library for Agriculture and the Environment, and the University of 
Iowa. For the last decade, the IDEP has been working to overcome the challenges on 
the forefront soil erosion estimates. The IDEP that aims to improve soil erosion 
estimates across the state of Iowa by focusing on the role of localized heavy 
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rainstorms that dramatically affect erosion. Other soil erosion models estimate 
water erosion by using rainfall averages over the long run, but soil erosion doesn’t 
occur on average; erosion by water occurs when and where it rains. Previous 
estimates for large areas fail to account so precisely for localized and highly weather 
variable nature of soil erosion.143 Richard Cruse and the other scientists at the IDEP 
argue that soil erosion models like RUSLE and RUSLE2 that use long run 
precipitation averages significantly underestimate soil erosion because of the 
extreme volumes of soil lost in heavy storms.144 And the work of the IDEP will only 
become more relevant in the future as weather patterns intensify with climate 
change.145 
Iowa Daily Erosion Project uses the WEPP model, drawing data from 1997 
USDA NRI report for field measurements, and from the Hydraulic Rainfall Analysis 
Project (HRAP) which uses advanced weather radar technology across the state of 
Iowa, for precipitation data every 15 minutes in 4 square mile increments. NRI 
report provides various data points within every township (36 mi2) but does not 
specify precisely where each data point is within each township. The IDEP then 
creates a distribution of possible erosion rates within each township, running 
calculations with every combination of NRI field specifications against every 
precipitation measurement in each township. The minimum values of these 
distributions represent the erosion estimates if the least amount of rainfall in the 
township occurred on the most well protected and least erodible land, while the 
maximum values represent the worse case scenario, the greatest amount of rainfall 
on the most erodible land. Both the minimum and maximum values of the IDEP 
distributions likely occurred somewhere in that township on that day.146 
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The results of the IDEP are alarming. Erosion is often worst in the spring 
before planted crops can take root and when the ground is already saturated with 
snowmelt. A three day storm from May 5-7th 2010, resulted in IDEP soil loss 
estimates with the most vulnerable land in every township eroding at rates greater 
than the annual T-value (12.35 tons/hectares/year). The most vulnerable land in 10 
of Iowa’s townships was estimated to have eroded at the rate of 100 
tons/hectare/day. It’s possible that these values represent only the single worst 
field of the township. However, it’s also possible that these values represent many 
similar fields. Regardless, these results illustrate the catastrophic effects that a 
single storm can have on vulnerable land.  
Richard Cruse of Iowa State University contends that soil erosion modeling is 
limited by two major factors: the lack of field measurements (soil type, topography, 
crop management, conservation practices), and the use of long-run averages for 
precipitation data.147 Although the IDEP does much to overcome the challenges of 
precipitation data and the weather dependent and localized nature of soil erosion, it 
still faces the problem of a lack of site-specific field data. Soil scientists constructing 
erosion models over vast areas don’t have nearly enough field measurement data. 
Surely databases within the USDA exist, such as the 1997 NRI report used by the 
IDEP, but such resources prove far more useful in garnering data on the soil type 
which is generally more consistent across a township, than on the site specific 
topography, and annual farming and conservation practices.148 
Besides the lack of field data, another significant barrier to soil erosion 
models is the failure to account for gullies. All of the major existing soil erosion 
models estimate sheet and rill erosion, cannot yet account for the formation of daily 
and ephemeral gullies, channels that form as it rains. In their review of the history 
and evolution of soil erosion models, Laflen and Flanagan (the lead developer of 
WEPP), suggests that the next major break through in soil erosion models needs to 
be an account of these ephemeral gullies.149 A National Resource Conservation 
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Service study in 1997 estimated that erosion from ephemeral gullies ranged 3.01 
tons/hectare/year (in Michigan) to 31.62 tons/hectare/year (in Virginia), 
concluding that if erosion from gullies were included, USLE soil loss estimates would 
be doubled.150 Another study in 2008 reported that ephemeral gullies cause a loss of 
5.51 to 12.13 tons/hectare/year that remains unaccounted for in our soil erosion 
models.151 Farmers are well aware of gullies on their land and many routinely 
smooth them over or fill them in with additional soil. But this practice only supplies 
more soil to be washed away in the same way as before. In fact, soil erosion from 
these the gullies actually worsen over time as they are repeatedly eroded and 
smoothed over.152 What is needed is not smoothing the gullies over so that the area 
can continue to be planted, but instead to plant the area that forms ephemeral 
gullies into a grass waterway. The NRCS defines grass waterways as, “constructed 
graded channels that are seeded to grass or other suitable vegetation. The 
vegetation slows the water and the grassed waterway conveys the water to a stable 
outlet at a non-erosive velocity.”153 The complication here is that grass waterways 
make farming more technical and tedious, and come with the opportunity costs of 
forgone crops. There is ongoing research and development into improving soil 
erosion models in order to account for gullies, such the study published by in 2014 
by Vieira et al.,154 and the 2016 study by Wells and Cruse et al.,155 but it will likely be 
some time before ephemeral gullies are included into mainstream soil erosion 
models.  
In his meta-analysis on soil formation rates and soil erosion rates, 
Montgomery finds that conventional agricultural erosion rates have a median of 
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roughly 18 tons/hectares/year and a mean of roughly 47 tons/hectares/year 
(assuming a soil bulk density of 1.2 g/cm3). That mean value tends to mirror his 
values for the geological erosion rates of alpine terrain, not that of the ‘cratons’ or 
the ‘soil-mantled’ terrain on which agriculture is actually practiced. However, due to 
the tremendous range of environments used in the various studies he draws from, 
the most reliable data in terms of assessing agriculture’s impact on erosion comes 
from studies which use the same (or comparable) land and observe its erosion 
under native vegetation and ‘conventional’ (with tilling) agriculture. From these 
specific studies, Montgomery finds median and mean values of 18 and 124-fold 
increase in erosion due to (mostly) conventional agriculture.156 
1.5 Ways for Farmers to Reduce Soil Erosion Rates 
The goal of agricultural conservation policy should be to ensure that farming 
practices are ecologically sustainable. Practically, this means ensuring that the 
present market forces make farmers weigh and consider the ecological costs of 
farming. The fact that farmers discount the long run ecological costs of farming is 
nothing unique to agriculture; there is tendency for both farmers and other 
individuals and firms in every industry to discount costs in the distant future. 
Further, the unsustainability of modern soil erosion rates in agriculture isn’t 
particularly unique in the ancient and ongoing history of exhausted agricultures. 
Focusing a conservation policy around a soil erosion tax is advantageous 
because it directly confronts the issue. Soil erosion is negatively associated with a 
wide array of conservation practices. There are numerous conservation practices 
that farmers might implement, but many do not implement every available one due 
to economic and technical considerations. A soil erosion tax would incentivize all 
necessary conservation practices in the interest of avoiding higher tax cost.  
One category of conservation farming practices is the planting of 
conservation buffers. Conservation buffers are areas of land in constant vegetation 
that works to filter runoff and prevent erosion. These vegetative buffers, usually 
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some planted grass or alfalfa (which is technically not a grass, but is in the Fabaceae 
family) stop and slow the movement of sediment downhill and filter out chemicals 
from fertilizers and pesticides before draining into watersheds. Contour strips are 
strips of grass or cover crops planted across the middle of slopped fields, slowing 
sheet erosion as the soil moves downhill.157 Grass waterways are planted grass 
strips in the lower crevasses of fields where ephemeral gullies would typically form. 
Filter strips are grassed margins along the edge cultivated fields and watersheds, 
and riparian buffers are similar to filter strips but utilize forest cover and trees in 
addition to grass or cover crops. Conservation buffers have the potential to prevent 
more than 50% of the loss of nutrients and pesticides, more than 60% of the loss of 
certain fertilizer pathogens, and up to 75% of sediment loss.158  
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Cover crops are planted grasses, legumes, and forbs for the purpose of 
seasonal cover to reduce erosion by wind and water, increasing SOM, recycling and 
redistributing soil nutrients, weed suppression, and reducing soil compaction.160 
Fall cover crops are an especially important conservation practice. Without fall 
cover crops, the soil lays bare during in the late fall after harvest and early spring 
before planting, meaning that the soil is especially susceptible to erosion. More than 
50% of annual soil erosion in many temperate areas occurs when frozen soils are 
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thawing.161 It is critical to use cover crops to prevent erosion losses in during this 
thawing period. The use of fall cover crops and cover crops planted in strips in 
conjunction with the cash crop throughout the rest of the growing season also helps 
aeration of the soil, lowering soil compaction and allowing for greater moisture 
absorption during wet periods, and better moisture retention during dry periods. 
But perhaps the greatest benefit of using cover crops is their preservation of 
nitrates. Cover crops pull up nitrates from the soil and store them, preventing the 
common problem of nitrate leaching that occurs when nitrogen fertilizers wash 
away and/or leach through the soil, eventually ending up in waterways. Cover crops 
can store excess nitrogen until they die and begin to mineralize. The decomposing 
biomass provides the cash crop with additional Nitrogen throughout the growing 
season.162 
Conservation practices are implemented to their current extent because 
there are significant economic advantages that accompany ecological stewardship. 
Over the decades, the use of conservation practices has significantly improved 
erosion rates [See figure: Soil Erosion Rates from ’82-‘07]. However conservation 
practices are not always implemented and maintained as often as they should. It 
requires a significant amount of design, engineering, and labor to implement perfect 
contour strips and grass waterways so that every necessary area of a field is 
grassed. Also, planting areas of grass instead of crops in the middle of a cultivated 
field is an opportunity cost. The government program Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP) provides financial incentivizes for the planting of such 
conservation buffers in order to reduce the costs.163 But funding for EQIP and other 
similar programs is generally insufficient.164 Further explanation on EQIP and 
current conservation policies are provided in section two. 
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The significantly improved erosion rates under no-till farming is a silver 
lining in the results of Montgomery’s meta-analysis of soil erosion and formation 
rates. No-till involves leaving the soil structure intact (not tilling it) and letting the 
crop residue that remains after harvest lay on the surface rather than incorporating 
it. No-till has become increasingly popular over the past decades due primarily to 
the increased yields and productivity that results from healthier soil.166 No-till was 
relatively new on the scene in the 1970s, but in 2000, 16% of US cropland was no-
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till.167 Globally No-till has grown from about 45 million hectares in 1999, then 72 
million ha in 2003, and 111 million ha in 2009.168  There is no singular or precise 
definition for no-till farming, because many farmers who claim to practice ‘no-till’ in 
fact practice rotational tillage, perhaps tilling once every four years, once every 
other year, or even once a year at the end of the growing season. The soil should 
remain permanently layered with crop residues from previous cash crops or cover 
crops, but the amount of residue that is kept as litter also varies greatly across no-
till farms. Crop rotation is also supposed to be a fundamental element of no-till 
farming but the degree to which no-till farmers rotate cover crops and which crops 
are rotated also varies greatly. In order to practice no-till, specialized equipment is 
necessary for penetrating the crop litter during seeding, as well as extra pesticides 
for weed and pest management (weeds are normally killed by tilling). Under all 
these requirements (tilling less than annually, utilizing a permanent residue layer, 
and regularly rotating cash crops with cover crops) no-till farming is considered the 
epitome of the widely used concept of ‘Conservation Agriculture’.169 Although the US 
has always been the leading country for adopting no-till (approximately 25% of US 
land under cultivation is no-till, self defined), of the 25.3 million hectares of no-till 
cultivated land in the US in 2004, only about 10 to 12 percent is permanently under 
this system and less than half of land under ‘no-till’ would qualify under the stricter 
definition of Conservation Agriculture. The reasons for this are practical and 
economical; with the help of US farm policy and the subsidy farm support system, it 
is more profitable to practice monoculture year after year on the same field than to 
practice careful crop rotations. Also, it is less technically complicated and laborious 
to farm with conventional practices and tillage.170 
Montgomery’s meta-analysis finds overwhelmingly that no-till, which is often 
practiced in tandem with other conservation practices, is positively associated with 
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lower rates of soil erosion. This is primarily because the surface layer of crop litter 
acts as a mulch increasing water retention and reducing runoff and erosion.171 From 
the 47 studies that Montgomery analyzed that included land being cultivated by 
‘conservation agriculture’, no-till farming resulted in .082 and .084 mm/year 
median and mean values of soil erosion (compared to the 1.537 and 3.939 mm/year 
median and mean values of soil erosion raters under conventional agriculture).172 
One of the first trials of no-till in the 1970s reported a 75% reduction in soil erosion 
from Indiana cornfields.173 A 1986 study showed that no-till farming reduced soil 
erosion by >90% over conventional tobacco cultivation.174 A 1993 study in 
Kentucky amazingly found that no-till methods decreased soil erosion 98%175 
Studies continue to show the yield increases and productivity benefits that 
accompany no-till. One recently published study compared fields under no-till and 
cover crops, to land cultivated with traditional tilling practices, and found that 
conservation agriculture improved yields 15% due to preserved microbial 
communities that better cycled carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus – critical nutrients 
in soil.176 
Montgomery’s results showed that no-till farming lowered soil erosion rates 
to roughly that of the geological erosion rate, suggesting that under no-till, soil 
erosion is nearly a null issue. Although no-till and conservation agriculture can 
significantly improve our soil erosion and soil formation rates, two problems 
remain: coercing all farmers into implementing conservation agriculture, and the 
fact that unaccounted for ephemeral gulley erosion remains severe, even on fields 
with carefully implemented no-till. The studies that Montgomery compiled used 
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traditional soil erosion models that systematically underestimate the real amount of 
erosion because they do not account for ephemeral gullies and the volatile nature of 
soil erosion during storms. Improving soil erosion models to account for ephemeral 
gullies and sever weather patterns is the ongoing work of Richard Cruse and other 
researchers Iowa State.177 Even if every hectare of cultivated land were managed 
with no-till, we would not have yet solved the problem of soil erosion entirely. 
Perhaps more importantly, policy makers have remained unsuccessful in fostering 
market conditions that incentivize the widespread adoption of conservation 
practices. Even though no-till and conservation agricultural is not a cure-all for soil 
erosion and degradation, the implementation of these practices must be widespread 
and nearly universal across US farms. A soil erosion tax would quickly incentive the 
widespread adoption of these already existing conservation practices. 
In summary, agriculture is the very foundation of civilization and its practice 
has always been somewhat precarious. If modern civilization is to continue to 
flourish over the decades and centuries to come, it’s absolutely essential that we 
operate with sustainable rates of soil erosion and formation. In order to achieve this 
goal, we must improve soil erosion models so that conservation practices are driven 
by a more precise understanding of the economic costs that result from farming 
practices, as well as the costs associated with the absence of conservation practices. 
One central question to conservation agriculture, what is the economic cost in lost 
yield due to soil erosion, remains almost completely ambiguous. This question is 
exactly what Rick Cruse aims to answer in his ongoing research grant from the 
Leopold Center. Gaining a better understanding of the exact economic costs at hand 
with soil erosion provides policy makers even more justification for the imposition 
of Pigouvian tax strategy in order to internalize the externalities of soil erosion, 
which will in turn incentivize farmers into implementing the many specific 
agronomic practices that improve the sustainability of soil erosion/formation. 
Indeed many of these conservation techniques are currently practiced, but they 
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remain sparsely adopted. The goal of agricultural policy should be to ensure that the 
practices proven to improve soil conservation are universally adopted. 
Section 2: Modern US Farm Policy 
2.1 Brief History of the Farm Bill 
 
Just as lessons were learned from the dust bowl that justify the 
implementation of a soil erosion tax, the history of US farm policy since the dust 
bowl reinforces the need to break from the mold of failed conservation policies. 
Also, a brief examination of the progression of agricultural policy and successive 
farm bill illustrates the purpose, necessity, and complexity of the expensive and 
expansive US agricultural policy system as a whole. In order to prescribe policy 
solutions for the present and future, it’s fundamental to first understand the past. 
Modern American agricultural policy began in the 1930s as an attempt to 
address a crisis of overproduction. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
managed to mostly salvage an oversaturated industry and was committed to the 
well-being of each individual farmer in the face of market forces that would have led 
to the bankruptcy of many. In the decades that followed agricultural policy evolved 
through various farm bill legislations. Though the specific policies have changed 
significantly over the decades, each farm bill has continued to provide a price floor 
and income support for farmer, and to find new and creative ways for increasing the 
demand for agricultural goods. Instead of the bankruptcy that seemed imminent due 
to market forces, most farmers left agriculture by their own will over the last eight 
decades of farm policy. There were roughly six million farms in 1930, while today 
there are around 2 million, a number that has remained relatively constant since 
1990.178 Although soil conservation has played a role throughout modern US 
agricultural policy, its role has always been secondary to more urgent economic 
concerns. The following is a brief history of the farm bill since the 1930s. The 
security of farm income and the stimulation of demand have always been the 
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primary goals of US agricultural policy – immediate economic security first, long run 
ecological considerations second. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administration entered Washington in 
1933 with more political capital than any new president in US history. Congress and 
the executive branch were both prepared to try anything in order to combat the 
Great Depression. One such ad hoc policy was the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA) – the beginning of a long tradition of farm bills - signed into law on May 12, 
1933. As mentioned before in the discussion of the dust bowl, American agriculture 
was in a crisis of overproduction, a massive supply glut. The price of agricultural 
commodities had fallen too low to keep individual farmers above the costs of 
operating the farm. The AAA aimed to revitalize the revenue of farmers to what it 
had been in the Golden Age of American Agriculture (1909-1914). It established the 
baseline (parity) of optimal farm-household purchasing power179, using the average 
costs of production and farm revenue during that period of farm prosperity. Policy 
makers of the 1930s aimed to supplement farmer’s income in order to restore their 
purchasing power to parity. The AAA authorized the USDA to offer direct payments 
to farmers in exchange for participation in acreage control programs for ‘basic 
crops’. This way, they could pump revenue to farmers while also decreasing the 
amount each farmer planted.  The law established taxes on food processors, and 
used that tax revenue to fund the direct payments and acreage control programs, as 
well as other policies of the AAA.  
Although the AAA could limit acreage in the future, it needed to address the 
issue of oversupply for the crops already planted in 1933.  Non-recourse loans, 
provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) were initiated as temporary 
emergency measures, until the production control policies fixed the market in the 
long run. These loans effectively set price floors for given commodities, as the 
government became a guaranteed buyer at that rate. The first cotton loan level in 
1933 was set at 69 percent parity, corn at 60 percent parity180, meaning that the 
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price at which the government would buy corn would be the estimated price for 
providing farmers with 60 percent of the full purchasing power of the average 
farmer between 1909 – 1914.   
As mentioned in Part A, Section 3, in 1936 the Supreme Court case Butler v. 
United States ruled the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1993 unconstitutional. The 
direct payments by the federal government to individual farmers for production 
control provisions - funded by the tax on food processors - was ruled an 
overextension of the federal government’s power versus that of individual states. 
The reason for the ruling was the use of the specific tax on food processors. Despite 
being unconstitutional; the AAA had been successful in pumping revenue into the 
rural economy; farm income in 1935 had risen 50 percent since 1932, largely 
because of the AAA.181 
Needing an alternative method for coordinating the limit of agricultural 
production, in 1936 congress passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment 
Act and established Hugh Hammond Bennett’s Soil Conservation Service. The Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) was established as a permanent agency. The SCS’s  
primary policy tool was the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP), which was 
the original land retirement program and would serve as a precursor for similar 
land-retirement programs, as well as other conservation programs to come. The 
ACP could restrict the still imminent over-production by paying farmers for shifting 
acreage from ‘soil depleting crops’, such as cotton or corn, to ‘soil enriching crops’, 
such as alfalfa, peanuts, etc. That year, the incentives for soil conservation alone 
proved inadequate for widespread crop reduction. A drought in ’36 kept prices high, 
and obscured the failure of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act to 
incentivize farmers into planting less and conserving soil resources. However, 
commodity surpluses and falling prices the following year in 1937 made it clear that 
the ACP, alone, was ineffective for the reduction of agricultural production.182 From 
the beginning, soil conservation policies were about making the long run 
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sustainable behavior economical for farmers, but just like the conservation policies 
that would follow, it failed to draw enough excitement and political support from 
farm communities. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 aimed to reestablish the control lost 
by the USDA with the ruling of Butler v. United States. Explicitly defending its 
congressional authority to govern matters of interstate commerce, the AAA of 1938 
drew its funds from the general tax pool. The AAA of 1938 was essentially the same 
as the AAA of 1933, only slightly more assertive, mandating (versus providing the 
option for) the USDA to provide non-recourse loan price supports for wheat, corn, 
and cotton, and at the option of the Secretary of Agriculture for many other crops. 
Marketing quotas were established (pending a referendum by all of the farmers of 
that commodity on whether to participate as a whole) for corn, cotton, rice, wheat, 
and tobacco. Farmers who remained under their allocated marketing quotas 
received tax exemptions, while those who exceeded their marketing quotas received 
no tax exemptions. The need for these market quotas was illustrated in 1939, when 
tobacco growers voted against the quota in their referendum; the resulting 
overproduction was disastrous to the industry and the marketing quota was voted 
back into effect the next year. The AAA established the rates of loans for specific 
commodities usually between 50 and 75 percent of parity, but at the Secretary of 
Agriculture’s discretion. The 1938 AAA also established the first government crop 
insurance program183 and established country soil conservation districts.184  
WWII provided an enormous economic stimulus for the American economy, 
mostly through profits from defense contracts. In 1941, congress aimed to provide 
the benefits of the military industrial complex to farmers. CCC loan rates were 
raised to 85 percent parity until 1946 for all normally supported ‘basic’ 
commodities and also ‘non-basic’ farm commodities that the Secretary of 
Agriculture saw fit to support so as to increase wartime production. In 1942, new 
amendments and legislation continued to raise CCC loan rates up to 90 percent 
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parity for basic and non-basic commodities. In 1944 and 1945 the CCC purchased 
cotton at 100 percent parity.185 The use of incredibly high farm subsidies 
throughout WWII was touted as a way of increasing the income of family farms but 
it was also a way for the military to secure food for troops. With very high non-
recourse loan rates, more farmers forfeited their grains and kept their loan rates. 
This kept the government storage bins full and soldiers fed.  
Until WWII, stockpiles in government granaries continued to rise along with 
concern about the excess storage. However, the excess stock proved valuable with 
the onset of World War II. Rather than the criticism of excess storage that was 
common in the thirties and early forties, post-war convention held that the 
government granaries should always be stocked to meet wartime levels. WWII let 
America forget that farmers still produced more than what was demanded due to 
the price floor. The AAA of 1933 and the following agricultural policies worked in 
the short run to keep farms financial afloat, but did not fix the underlying and long 
run factor of too many farmers needing to produce too much in order to cover the 
costs of operation. 
Phasing out farm-support spending has been ever-present challenge of policy 
makers since the beginning of modern farm support – a challenge that has never 
been overcome entirely. Wartime price supports were set to expire at the end of 
1948 and would’ve reverted to the 50 – 75 percent range mandated by the 1938 
AAA. Afraid of what abruptly lowering the price floor would do to farmers who 
depended on price supports, Congress hoped to ease the transition away from such 
high price floors. The Agricultural Act of 1948 maintained mandatory CCC loan rates 
for a variety of crops at 90 percent parity for the year of 1949. Another legislation 
the following year updated the loan rates so that basic crops received 90 percent 
parity payments in 1950, between 90 and 80 percent in 1951, then levels varying 
from 75 to 90 percent in 1952 and onward. However, the breakout of the Korean 
War prevented this transition to lower supports from occurring. The Secretary of 
Agriculture used the national security clause to maintain payments at 90 percent 
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parity for every basic commodity except peanuts. Acreage allotment programs were 
also ignored in 1951 and 1952 for wheat, corn, cotton, and rice. Following the end of 
the Korean War in 1953, debate ensued whether to keep prices fixed high, or 
flexible over a range of parity rates. The Agricultural Act of 1954 established a 
flexible scale of price supports at 75 to 90 percent parity following 1955 indefinitely 
for all basic crops (except tobacco which was mandated at 90 percent parity). 186 
Without the outlet for surplus stores provided by feeding troops in WWII and 
then the Korean War, farm policy needed a new way to dispose of surpluses gained 
from the utilization of the price floor. In 1954 Congress also passed the Agricultural 
Trade and Assistance Act (commonly referred to as Public Law 480 or P.L. 480) that 
established the Food For Peace program. Under the pretense of humanitarian aid, 
P.L. 480 allowed ‘friendly’ countries to purchase US farm commodities with local 
currency. The clause for only ‘friendly’ nations was discourage poor countries from 
associating with communism and the Soviet Bloc, and the use of nation’s local 
currency allowed them to save on foreign exchange reserves making the purchase 
dramatically cheaper. The prices provided by the US government were much 
cheaper than what local producers could offer, as well as other agricultural 
producing and exporting nations (Canada, Australia, Argentina and New Zealand). 
Like any trade dumping, the Food for Peace program was to the advantage of the US 
agricultural industry, and to the advantage of consumers in the nations that the 
goods were imported, but to the disadvantage of any domestic farmer or other 
international agricultural producer also supplying within that market. Since the 
1950s, despite externalities to local farmers, the Food for Peace and food aid 
programs that evolved from it has been critical tools for increase of US supplied 
markets and the removal of surplus commodities.187 
For the last two decades, following the failure of the 1936 Soil and 
Conservation act to adequately limit production, agricultural policies had focused on 
price supports rather than production limits. Farmers were happy to receive a boost 
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of income support in order to escape the Great Depression and the increased 
wartime demand in the 1940s and 50s made high price floors feasible. However, the 
Agricultural Act of 1956 represented a movement back towards focusing on limiting 
acreage with the establishment of the Soil Bank. The Soil Bank program provided 
paid contracts to farmers who agreed to plant less than the allotment for crops with 
acreage allotments already established (wheat, cotton, corn, tobacco, peanuts and 
rice) and also provided paid contracts for farmers who simply put land to 
conservation reserve for a designated period of up to ten years. For the first time 
since 1936, federal farm policy spurred a significant movement towards soil and 
resource conservation. In fact, the conservation reserves were occasionally so 
popular that it caused severe complications in some rural communities where 
farmers put all of their land into conservation.188 A local farm economy with all of 
the land in conservation is poor business for mechanics, truck drivers, seasonal 
harvest workers, and other agricultural service sectors.  
Farm policy continued to evolve in the 60’s in order to keep up with the 
improving efficiency of agricultural production. The trends in farm policy were 
toward more conservation, in order to limit production, and finding new outlets for 
surplus stores. The Feed Grain Act of 1961 reestablished CCC loan rates at not less 
than 65 percent parity (the effective rate became 74 percent) and incentivized 
acreage conservation by providing price support for corn and grain producers only 
after retiring at least 20 percent of the land used for these crops during the previous 
two years. The Agricultural Act of 1961 and following legislation of the ‘60s 
continued to incentivize increased acreage conservation. The increased 
conservation was an economic strategy more than an ecological consideration; 
increasing yields and growing government granary stocks called for action against 
overproduction. The growing government stocks began to be used for social 
welfare, first with the use of a pilot food stamp program under Kennedy, and then 
it’s full implantation under Johnson. Throughout the decade, government reserves 
from the utilization of the CCC loan rate (price floor) were increasingly spent 
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towards resource allotment to school lunch programs and international distribution 
of American produce abundance. Also, exports under P.L. 480 increased 40 % under 
the Kennedy Administration. 189 
When the US withdrew from the Breton Woods Agreement (a system for 
exchange rate management established by the UN following WWII) over 1971 and 
1973, because of running a persistent gold exchange deficit, the US dollar declined 
in foreign exchange value. When the US dollar declined in value, US agricultural 
commodities became more competitive in international markets. Exports boomed 
and commodity prices continued to rise. This, along with general inflation, the OPEC 
oil embargo, and the popular belief of declining natural resources, resulted the 
doubling of farmland prices between 1972 and 1979. The high land prices lead to 
the most intense period of rural investment (farm machinery, buildings and rural 
housing) since the Golden Age of Agriculture before WWI.190  
With a dollar favoring US exports and a massive purchase of US wheat by the 
Russian Government. The USDA asked farmers to plant fencerow to fencerow in 
order to answer the call of markets. Farmers eagerly removed land from the 
conservation programs that had been established by the Soil Bank since the ‘50s. 
The 1970s showed how difficult it can be to maintain conservation retirement 
programs over the long run, especially once they are no longer economical in the 
short run.191 
Although the devaluation of the dollar increased US exports for a short while, 
the dollar soon appreciated and exports shrank. Prices for farm commodities 
dropped and by the mid 80’s land prices had dropped 30 to 50 percent. Soon 
deficiency payments and nonrecourse loans were heavily utilized and the 
government took entitlement to hundreds of millions of bushels of grain.192 
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Due to growing discontent with the costs of agricultural policy, and also 
concern over the ecological imbalance of the US agricultural market, there was 
significant political momentum for policy reform in the 1980s. In 1985, State 
Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri, and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, 
drafted a farm bill that would have set a strict supply control system. Farmers would 
have been allotted quotas for production and sales. Any amount over the quota 
would be illegal for sale. This would’ve streamlined an increasingly complex farm 
support and production allotment system and greatly reduced costs to the treasury, 
but also would have increased food prices for consumers. It was never voted in 
largely because of skepticism about the practicality of a strict supply control system 
for commodities with such vast quantities and range of international markets.193  
The 1885 farm bill that did become implemented represented a desperate 
attempt to regain lost export markets. The downturn in exports was blamed on too 
high of loan rates that created all around high prices for US agricultural 
commodities. Congress hoped that by reducing price supports and providing export 
subsidies, they could reclaim international markets. Policy makers failed to 
recognize that the trend towards lost exports was partially the result of 
independently rising agriculturally exporting nations who were now benefiting 
from the technological improvements on acreage efficiency that US farming had 
been reaping for half a century. US farmers were simply not as price competitive 
against international competition and the export subsidies required to make their 
commodities price competitive were immense. The price of farm commodities in the 
US that was necessary to assure that farmers covered their running costs was 
simply higher than what was required to sustain farmers revenue and cover input 
costs required in poorer countries with weaker currency.194 
The 1985 farm bill was also the first to have a separate title in the bill for 
conservation; it represented a significant shift towards conservation, rather than 
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just acreage allotments and supply control. New programs were added such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which incentivized the retirement of 
farmland on contracts, just like the Soil Bank did in the 1950s, and the ACP of the 
1930s. But most significantly, the 1985 farm bill set up a Conservation Compliance 
program in order to coerce farmers into using conservation practices and lowering 
their rates of soil erosion. Conservation compliance meant that farmers on ‘highly 
erodible land’ were required to develop and implement a ‘farm conservation plan’ 
by 1995. The failure to comply would result in the extreme penalty of lost eligibility 
for all farm program benefits (price-support programs, CCC loans, government crop 
insurance, and even CRP payments). The initial enforcement of conservation 
compliance caused political uproar in rural communities where the soil 
conservation service were declaimed, ‘soil cops’. However, due to the vagueness of 
the law that mandating the establishment of some ‘conservation plan’, it was never 
clear exactly where to draw the line against non-compliant farmers, especially when 
the penalty was so high for farmers.195 From its creation in 1985 to its effective 
removal in 1996, the conservation compliance program was unpopular and rarely 
enforced. 
Farm policy remained relatively the same throughout the late 80’s and early 
90’s (other than the Soil Conservation Service being renamed the National 
Resources Conservation Service, in 1994)196 until the Federal Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR) under the Clinton Administration. The 
1996 farm bill, euphemized the Freedom to Farm Act, was the result of a fiscally 
conservative Congress that aimed to wean farmers off of government price 
supports. This was acceptable for the agribusinesses lobby only if the new 
legislation removed restrictive conservation programs, like the conservation 
compliance program from 1985. Farm policy was seen as a retardant to the growth 
of the agricultural sector (as if that wasn’t the point – the reason farm policy was 
always seen necessary was to keep an industry that systemically produced too much 
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financially afloat). Congress was eager to cut budget costs, and the Clinton 
Administration hoped to foster a new era of US agriculture that was more kosher to 
the demands of the WTO (newly established in 1995) and global trade policy. Also, 
policy makers were optimistic that the projections for rising demands in China 
would make unregulated agricultural exports feasible.197 
The 1996 farm bill was a seven-year program for dismantling the long-
standing price support system for farm commodities. The transition towards no 
government price supports was to be eased by a series of direct cash payments, 
related to farmers previous years of production. These cash payments would slowly 
decrease over the seven-year span. Direct payments were ‘decoupled’, meaning the 
crops concerned, their prices and levels of production would be irrelevant. Their 
implementation has (in theory) no distortion of farmer’s decisions on which 
commodities to produce. A corn subsidy, for example, is coupled because it 
incentivizes farmers to grow corn. An automatic direct payment, given regardless of 
prices or production decisions, is decoupled because farmers producing behavior 
remains unaffected. Decoupled farm support is the only agricultural protectionism 
fully endorsed by the WTO. The 1996 Farm bill also eliminated annual acreage 
control programs and most public stocks that were associated with CCC loans. The 
USDA would no longer place limits on farmer’s production – thus the ‘Freedom to 
Farm Act’. Also, failure to meet Conservation Compliance would no longer result in 
any penalty. 198 
Farmers and policy makers were optimistic that the necessary changes 
toward equilibrium could occur painlessly through the action of the farmers alone. If 
prices dropped, individual farmers would understand that they should plant less of 
that crop and perhaps more of some other crop with higher demand. The free-
market would supposedly balance itself and at the liberation of taxpayer budget. 
However things did not go as planned. 1995 had been a shortfall in corn production 
so things went on as normal. Levels rose in 1996 and by 1998, a good crop year (but 
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not a record year) made for a glut and prices fell. Corn farmers were running 
operations in the red. The government, that had only two years ago proclaimed the 
farm bill to end all farm bills, sprang into action for emergency relief. Huge 
emergency payments and loan deficiency payments were provided over the next 
four years. The 1996 farm bill had failed. Farmers proved too unorganized to 
painlessly transition towards market equilibrium. As soon as the ‘natural’ process of 
eliminating suppliers in an oversaturated market began, the government reassumed 
the role as the crutch for a systemically unsustainable agricultural industry. 199  
The 2002 farm bill was not a complete relapse to old policies. Congressmen 
Ron Kind of Wisconsin and a coalition of representatives (many of them from farm 
states) sponsored an amendment to the proposed bill that would have shifted 
billions of dollars from the commodity specific programs to conservation programs. 
The amendment failed by a slim margin and the 2002 farm bill became another 
installment of classical US farm support. The Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman 
was not a supporter of the final 2002 bill. She was openly critical of traditional farm 
support programs and hopped to transition support towards conservation rather 
than subsidies. Conservation would address the issue of overproduction, lower 
commodity prices and utilized government support. Although there were also 
significant efforts by congresspersons to address the systemic issues of 
overproduction, reform proved futile and subsidies reigned over the bill. 17 billion 
dollars was allotted to conservation programs, while the commodity subsidy 
programs were expected to cost 190 billion over the next 10 years.200  
The 2002 farm bill was in many was a relapse into the traditional price and 
income support policies. The support shown for the Kind amendment, however, 
provided optimism to those looking for reform, and various interest groups began to 
set their eyes on the incoming farm bill, which would eventually be passed in 2008. 
Although the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act was largely a failure, fiscal conservatives 
still wanted nothing to with farm subsidies, which they saw as the paradigm of 
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wasteful big government. Environmentalists wanted greater emphasis on 
conservation, protection of watersheds and regulation of environmentally 
destructive farm practices. Anti-hunger activists wanted greater focus on the food 
stamps and foreign aid programs. Global justice activists wanted the removal of 
‘trade distorting subsidies’ that maintained surplus domestic production and the 
subsequent fall of global prices, benefiting wealthy US farmers at the expense of 
poor farmers in developing nations. Urban and corporate America wanted a globally 
friendly direction for US agricultural policy that could move negotiations forward at 
the Doha round of global trade talks and pave the way for profitable global trade 
agreements, opening access to new markets. By 2005, a hodgepodge of 35 different 
organizations, from the politically far right to the far left, loosely affiliated by a 
commitment to agricultural policy reform, called themselves the Alliance for 
Sensible Agricultural Policy (ASAP).201 Although the various organizations of the 
ASAP disagreed on exactly how US farm policy should change, their mutual goals 
were threefold: “to pare back government payments seen as duplicative, wasteful, 
and tilted toward the wealthiest farmers; to phase out subsidies seen as propping 
up rich farmers at the expense of unsubsidized farmers in developing countries; and 
to use the savings either to reduce the federal deficit or to boost financing for 
nutrition, rural development, conservation, and renewable energy.”202  
Commodity programs were targeted as the main culprit of globally trade 
distorting and domestically wasteful farm support. Because the commodity 
programs support the price of commodity, quantity matters, and very large farmers 
sometimes reap in very large amounts of government payments. The inclusion of 
large farmers into the public safety net made more sense when agricultural policy 
implemented acreage control programs that those receiving price and income 
supports had to comply with. This was done in order to scale back production and 
raise prices. An acreage control program would have been senseless without 
including the largest farmers. But such programs ended with the 1996 farm bill, and 
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so the exclusion of the largest and wealthiest farmers from government support was 
now a real possibility.203 
Another major goal of the reform movement was also to end the duplicity of 
safety nets and provide a single payer system of government farm support. 
Currently, the farm bill provided two safety nets: one, a vast network of public 
support programs, the other, a semiprivate subsidized crop insurance safety net. In 
2006, the American Farmland Trust (AFT) endorsed the ideas of Carl Zulauf, 
professor of agriculture at Ohio State University. Zulauf argued that the most glaring 
flaw in farm policy was the dual safety net, and that its merger would save 
taxpayer’s money and provide a real safety net.204 The Iowa Corn Growers 
Association made a similar endorsement towards a single payer system, and 
provided the blue prints – through the work of Iowa State University economist, 
Bruce Babcock – for the Average Crop Revenue (ACR) plan. The ACR would become 
government provided revenue insurance. If chosen, farmers would forfeit any 
entitlement to countercyclical payments and a portion of direct payments but would 
secure their end of the year revenue, which would be calculated by how much and 
what each individual planted. 205 
The political pressure for agricultural reform was higher than ever before, 
but the 2006 congressional election would change the landscape in Washington 
unexpectedly. The Democratic Party won a sweeping victory over both houses of 
Congress in 2006. In the Senate, the Democrats won six new seats, and in the House, 
31 new seats, and without a single incumbent loosing their district. Nancy Pelosi 
became the first-ever female Speaker of the House. Nineteen of the party’s victories 
came from rural states that had voted for Bush. The Democratic Party Leadership 
had a new agenda for agricultural policy in order to consolidate their new hold. 
They placed eight freshman House Representatives on the Agricultural Committee, 
putting them in a position to take credit for a 2008 farm bill that brought big 
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dividends to the rural community. In an interview with Dan Morgan, House Majority 
Leader Steny Hoyer of Maryland explained the predicament, “It is a real challenge, 
because we want to make some changes [in farm policy] but we don’t want to put 
our members at risk.” Politicians don’t win elections by being fiscally responsible on 
a national level, they win elections by serving the interests of their constituents, and 
that’s exactly what these new ‘Agricrats’ did.206 
After a long and embittered political process (multiple failed drafts and 
amendments through the House, significant revisions in the Senate, a veto by 
president Bush, and the final override in the House, made possible by rampant pork 
barreling) the $307 billion 2008 farm bill was passed. For better or worse, 
significant reform didn’t happen – the bill largely resembled the 2002 farm bill, 
except that it had added on an additional $10 to $20 billion in order to appease a 
much wider span of interest groups that at one point had stood for reform.207  The 
ACR program was implemented, under the name Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE) but in a watered-down version. Lobbing efforts by the crop insurance 
proved effective and the ACR as originally envisioned was tweaked so as not to 
encroach on the private sector. The Corn Growers Association Ron Litterer claimed 
this tweak robbed the ACR of providing any meaningful reform.208  
President Bush’s veto message provides an adequate critique of the 2008 
farm bill: “At a time of high food prices and record farm income, this bill lacks 
program reform and fiscal discipline. It continues subsidies for the wealthy and 
increases farm bill spending by more than $20 billion, while using budget gimmicks 
to hide much of the increase. It is inconsistent with our objectives in international 
trade negotiations.” The president also said it was “irresponsible to increase 
government subsidy rates for 15 crops, subsidize additional crops, and provide 
payments that further distort markets.” The Bush administration also criticized the 
implementation of ACRE, which created yet another farm bureaucracy and provided 
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a new and ‘uncapped’ revenue guarantee.209 The 2008 farm bill was another blow to 
those pushing away from government support. 
The 2014 farm bill became dangerously closed to not being passed, but after 
an emotional plea and some careful political maneuvering by Rep. Frank Lucas, 
chairman of the agricultural committee, a farm bill was finally agreed upon by 
Congress and signed by President Obama in Feb 2014. 210 The most significant 
change in the 2014 Agricultural Act was the elimination of 40.85 billion dollars in 
direct payments (this removed nearly all direct payments, except for certain direct 
payments to cotton growers which were phased out over the next two years).211 In 
place of the direct payments, there’s increased protection against declining revenue 
through the ACRE program and other insurance programs. The projected 10-year 
costs are around one trillion dollars,212 but relative to continued expenditure of 
programs from the 2008 bill, it saved 16.5 billion over the 10-year period.213 Instead 
of addressing low prices with targets fixed by Congress, the 2014 farm bill focuses 
on programs that address revenue loss. Subsidized crop insurance is now a 
foundation of the US farm safety net, along with Title I, standard farm commodity 
programs. 214  
Title II, the conservation title, changed in some significant ways. Twelve 
programs were repealed and their roles consolidated into others programs so that 
there are now four main approaches to conservation policy in the farm bill: 1) land 
retirement (Conservation Reserve Program [CRP]), 2) enhanced conservation 
practices on agricultural land (Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP] 
and Conservation Stewardship Program [CSP]), 3) Government purchase of 
easements for preserving natural resources and ecosystems on private land 
(Agricultural Conservation Easement Program), 4) fostering local partnerships to 
address site specific environmental issues (the Regional Conservation Partnership 
                                                        
209 Morgan, “Farm Bill and Beyond,” 51. 
210 “Passing The Agricultural Act Of 2014 | Congressman Frank Lucas,” 2015Accessed August 31 
2015. Lucas.house.gov 
211 Zulauf, and Orden, The US Agricultural Act Of 2014: Overview And Analysis, 14. 
212 Zulauf, and Orden, The US Agricultural Act Of 2014: Overview And Analysis, 1. 
213 Zulauf, and Orden, The US Agricultural Act Of 2014: Overview And Analysis, 18. 
214 Zulauf, and Orden, The US Agricultural Act Of 2014: Overview And Analysis, 9. 
 80 
Program [RCPP]). Funding was cut from the CRP by $ 3 billion and from the CSP by 
$2 billion. Funding remained steady for EQIP, however it has been asked to pick up 
the slack from and perform the roles of several repealed programs. EQIP is meant to 
make conservation practices economically worthwhile for farmers, but there simply 
isn’t enough funding to cover everyone and acceptance into the program is highly 
competitive.215 CRP payments remain the most heavily funded, and in order to 
qualify for subsidized crop insurance and revenue insurance, farmers cannot plow 
any land with native sod.216 The consolidation of the roles of various repealed 
programs into the Regional Conservation Partnership Program could prove over 
time to be a significant shift in conservation policy approach, using government 
money to fund various local sustainability enterprises so that regional conservation 
practices are implemented at their own discretion.217  
 
2.2 Farm Bill History in Review 
 
Although US farm policy has always been primarily about the economic 
prosperity of American farmers, conservation has remained a constant aspect of 
farm policy since the 1930s, largely because of the environmental concern spurred 
by the dust bowl. And throughout this long and rich history, conservation has 
always fallen short of achieving anything resembling a permanent and ecologically 
sustainable agriculture. This short summary recounts the role of conservation over 
the last 83 years of US agricultural policy. 
Political momentum for conservation was initially triggered by the dust bowl 
and paved the way for Big Hugh Bennett’s 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act. From the beginning, the goal of agricultural conservation policy has 
been to better represent long run economic costs associated with ecological damage 
in the present decision making of farmers. The ACP helped make progress toward 
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this goal by providing cash incentives for alternating cash crops with soil-enriching 
crops. Ecologically responsible farming became more economical for farmers. But 
it’s critical to recognize that the only reason that land retirement and the ACP was 
politically achievable at the time, is because it was in the short run interests of the 
agricultural economy during the 1930s.  
However, soil conservation alone failed to entice farmers in the same way 
that the AAA had. The soil conservation districts established in 1938 were largely 
ignored during WWII and the Korean War because farmers preferred to do their job 
– grow crops and make money – instead of policing their neighbors.  
Following the high price floors of the 1940s and early 50s, the USDA and 
congressional policy makers found it difficult to lower the price support system; the 
equilibrium cost of farming (land, seeds, machinery, etc.) had adjusted to account 
for the new equilibrium farm income that included government supports, and now 
farmers could not remain profitable without the supports. Farm policy began to look 
like an endless system of ratcheting up farmers’ incomes, bit by bit, every year in 
order to continuously protect farmers from the risk of bankruptcy. And along with 
the escalating costs of the 1950s and ‘60s, the quantity of government owned grains 
were amassing as well. During these two decades, land retirement and soil 
conservation were economical for farmers in order to limit aggregate supply and 
raise prices – it was for this reason alone that soil conservation found political 
momentum and the Soil Bank program was established in 1956.  
Since the 1960s, agricultural policy has managed to partially avoid constantly 
escalationing the costs of farm support by implementing policies that increased the 
demand for agricultural commodities. The Food for Peace program, and school 
nutrition programs of the 1960s were examples of such policies for increasing 
demand. Demand then skyrocketed during the recession of the ‘70s, when the US 
export market was strong, and it again proved difficult to maintain soil conservation 
and land retirement programs against opposing economic forces. However, the 
strength of the US dollar recovered and in the 80s, US exports would have shrank, 
except that the 1985 Food Security Act made sure to protect our export markets. 
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Again, conservation was implemented in the 1980s because farmers felt the need to 
restrict aggregate production amidst falling prices.  
The 1985 farm bill took an assertive step in the direction of conservation 
with the use of the conservation compliance program, which mandated that farmers 
create a ‘conservation plan’ on highly erodible land. Like the failure of Dr. Gray’s 
plan from the 1930s for conservation compliance - a more strict system of localized 
oversight than the soil conservation districts that we have today – the 1985 plan 
was a federal legislation that never engendered enough local support to carry it 
through into its successful implementation. For the most part, farmers hated being 
told by the government how to do their job. And it must have extremely awkward 
for the local SCS/NRCS agents to suddenly begin policing farmers, their peers and 
fellow community members, at the threat of totally losing their farm support 
package.  Although conservation compliance technically remains on the books, the 
1996 farm bill removed its penalty of ineligibility for the rest of farm support 
payments.  
Various conservation programs remain on the books today, but funding is 
currently inadequate for the widespread application of programs, such as in the case 
of EQIP.  There remain important ecological challenges for agricultural policy to 
address. What follows in this essay is normative argument for the implementation of 






Section 3: A Soil Erosion Tax: Traditional Approach for New Solutions  
 
3.1 Pigouvian Taxes and Soil Erosion 
 
British economist Arthur C. Pigou (1877-1959) was a pioneer in the field of 
welfare economics. He is most famous for his development of the already existing 
but primitive concept of externalities. Externalities are costs imposed or benefits 
conferred on others that are not taken into account by the individual who is acting. 
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Pigou argued that negative externalities (pollution for example), if significant 
enough, warrant government intervention in the form of a tax that discourages that 
specific practice. The tax value is supposed to represent the social cost. Likewise, 
Pigou argued for government subsidies for activities with positive externalities 
(education for example). Taxes and subsidies for those purposes are called 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.218  
 
A Standard Pigouvian Tax219
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If this diagram were a soil erosion Pigouvian tax, the commodity will be land – quantity of land on the 
horizontal axis and its price on the vertical axis.  
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In Pigouvian economic theory, the government must find the ‘efficient level’ 
for a per unit tax. For example, the efficient level of an alcohol tax would make it so 
that the costs of individuals buying alcohol are equal to the normal private costs of 
buying alcohol, plus the social cost of alcohol consumption, which might include the 
probable damage of drunk driving or noise pollution. The socially optimal market 
outcome is the result of the new market equilibrium that results after the social 
costs, or externalities of this practice are imposed with a tax. The Pigouvian tax is set 
so that the marginal return of the practice includes the marginal social costs220 in 
other words, the return of producing or consuming one additional unit of some 
commodity is equal to the private cost plus the social costs that result. In the case of 
soil erosion, the unit should be an acre of cultivated land and the efficient level 
would represent the long run economic costs of soil erosion due to nutrient and 
organic matter loss, yield and productivity drops, sedimentation and pollution, and 
the reduction of our society’s food supply. A soil erosion tax would essentially be a 
land use tax. 
The recommendation of a soil erosion tax is nothing particularly novel or 
radical; it’s a traditional approach of welfare economic theory. There are multiple 
ways to go about Pigouvian taxes (taxing consumer or producers). I recommend a 
per unit tax on producers. In practice, this would be a per acreage tax, and therefore 
essentially a land use tax. Due to the vast amount of information required for a 
Pigouvian tax approach applied to agriculture, critics hold that such a policy is 
infeasible.221 However, perfect accuracy is not necessary for an effective Pigouvian 
tax; by lowballing the estimated social cost, policy makers can justify a soil erosion 
tax as being the least amount that we can afford to pay for soil erosion.  Another 
criticism of a Pigouvian tax on negative soil externalities of agriculture is that soil 
erosion and land degradation tend to increase with poverty; therefore taxes should 
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not be imposed on farmers, because the increased tax costs could lead to poverty.222 
However, this problem is less significant in the US and could be addressed by 
maintaining the already existing farm support system, especially the provision of 
countercyclical payments such as subsidized crop insurance and revenue insurance. 
What follows in Section 3 of this thesis is an argument for the use of such a 
Pigouvian tax strategy applied to soil erosion and an examination of some of the 
details and ramifications of its practical application. 
 
3.2 Estimating the Social Cost of Soil Erosion 
 
If Pigouvian taxes are a straightforward solution for agricultural 
conservation policy, why is such a policy not already in place? A part of the answer 
to this question is that the agribusiness lobby has great influence over the farm bill 
and agribusinesses generally do not want to be taxed (later I will argue for why 
farmers and agribusinesses should support a soil erosion tax). But another reason 
that agricultural policy does not already utilize a Pigouvian tax for the negative 
externalities of farming (like soil erosion) is that the issue is incredibly complex and 
any estimated value for the efficient level of a soil erosion tax would be inaccurate, 
because of the complexity in determining the social cost of soil erosion. The value of 
a Pigouvian tax is supposed to represent the social cost of some industry practice 
[see figure 5]. The biggest part of the social cost of soil erosion is the lost 
productivity over time. Determining the appropriate social cost of soil erosion is a 
matter of calculating the long run cost of lost yield due to soil erosion, not an easy 
undertaking. 
Calculating the efficient level for a per unit tax on soil erosion is technically 
problematic because is there are seemingly innumerable assumptions required. Soil 
erosion and decreased yields are a nearly inevitable result of cultivation, but to 
varying degrees depending on the soil type, the crop planted, the agronomic 
techniques used, the topography, the climate, the weather that year, and many, 
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many other factors. And then there’s the problem of how to account for the future of 
seed technology, because the new seeds farmers use are constantly improving 
yields. And although it might be easy to concede defeat in the face of such complex 
problem, effective policy action can still be achieved by calculating a value that will 
be inevitably inaccurate, but effectively accurate on the correct side of error. What is 
needed is a model for calculating the cost of lost yields and productive acreage due 
to soil erosion with assumptions that conservatively estimates the value of each 
factor, always estimating on the side of error for ‘low-balling’ the estimated social 
cost.  
The writers of The Economist take up this issue in their defense of carbon tax 
strategies: 
One objection frequently heard is that Pigouvian taxes require omniscience 
from their designers: in order to set the tax at the right level, we need to 
know, down to the last few dollars, exactly what the economic impact of 
climate change will be—obviously, an impossible task. This is a problem, but 
it's not necessarily a fatal one. OK, if we set the tax too low, there'll still be 
some residual inefficiencies left that a higher tax would have eliminated. But 
it's nevertheless better than not having a tax at all. This objection, it seems to 
me, essentially amounts to arguing that since perfection is unattainable, we 
should abandon the whole idea rather than merely settling for improving 
upon the status quo.223  
Likewise for a soil erosion tax, it’s seemingly impossible to calculate the exact 
economic impact of soil erosion. As the writers for The Economist point out, this is 
problematic, but not fatally so. It can be overcome by lowballing the appropriate 
value of the soil erosion tax. Even an inaccurate soil erosion tax would be effective at 
incentivizing alternative practices and thereby improving soil erosion rates.  
Economists, scientists, and policy makers would be wise to underestimate the social 
efficiency in every aspect of the calculation, seeking the path of least political 
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resistance. In defense of the tax, it would be an underestimation and therefore the 
minimum cost that we can afford to impose. Even a fraction of the real economic 
cost of soil erosion, if imposed onto farmers in the form of a tax, should be enough to 
incentivize farmers into implementing conservation practices on their own terms.  
In order to determine the appropriate tax value, one must apply an erosion 
model, such as the models discussed in Part B, Section 1.5, like WEPP, or RUSLE 2, in 
order to estimate the volume of soil lost on each given plot of land. Then the tax 
values should estimate the lost productivity due the estimated amount of soil 
erosion. As mentioned in my discussion of these models, there are limitations to 
currently used soil erosion models (such as ephemeral gulley erosion). A Pigouvian 
tax approach would benefit from the further development of soil erosion models, 
the economic models estimating the costs of erosion, and research into the socially 
efficient tax level, in order to improve the accuracy of the estimated social cost. 
Research and development into these models should constitute a greater portion of 
farm bill spending. 
I’m making the argument that a soil erosion tax is a good policy, justified by a 
historical approach, but I am not myself offering any model or dollar amount 
estimate of what this tax should look like in practice. I will leave that to real 
Economists. There is a host of literature that focuses on economic models 
concerning soil erosion. Such models are highly technical and a detailed discussion 
is beyond the scope of this essay; however their development and progress. In 1983, 
Kenneth McConnell published an economic model of soil erosion and 
conservation.224  One 1996 study published in the academic journal Ecological 
Economics modeled the on-sight and off-sight costs225 of soil erosion with the 
primary on-sight cost being lost productivity. The authors then applied the 
estimated costs into a general market equilibrium model that they used to 
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determine the larger social cost of soil erosion.226 Another study by Edna Loehman 
and Timothy Randhir was published in same journal in 1999 that explores various 
modeling strategies and policy solutions.227 Another study published by the 
Brazilian Soil Science Society (Sociedade Brasileir de Ciência do Solo) compiles 
various estimates on the on-site and off-site costs of soil erosion into a single meta-
analysis for estimating the total economic costs of soil erosion.228 The authors of 
each essay admit that their models are rough estimations of a complex issue but 
that’s the nature of the problem at hand. Policy makers should take a cue from these 
researchers and use the best tools available in order to address the externalities of 
soil erosion head on.  
3.3 Parallels Between Agricultural Policy and Climate Change Policy: Present and 
Future Value 
 
Both agricultural conservation policy and climate change policy aim to 
address the tendency of free market behavior to discount the present value of 
externalities that lie in the distant future. Just as the costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions are felt in the distant future once greenhouse gas pollution has built up 
over time and become severe enough to cause significant damage, the greatest costs 
of soil erosion lie in the distant future, once soil erosion has become severe enough 
over time that the productive capacity of American agriculture is greatly diminished. 
Private enterprise and sustainable agriculture are in discord because the short run 
demands of the market dictate the behavior of farmers, and the ecological costs of 
farming are discounted over time into the present market. Focusing on the analogy 
between climate change policy and agricultural policy, this section examines the 
role that discounting plays in our behavior and estimation of future ecological costs.  
The underlying fracture between private enterprise and sustainable 
agriculture is a conflict between present and future value. The microeconomic 
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behavior of individuals in the market is that we prefer money in the present, more 
than we prefer money in the future. Would you rather have $100 today, or $100 a 
year from now? Economic theory (and common sense) says that people prefer $100 
today, rather than a year from now, because the $100 received immediately could 
be invested or placed in a savings account and would grow over time. The 
interesting question is, how much more do we value things in the present than the 
future? Would you rather have $100 today or $101 a year from now? A rational 
person (which none of us really are) would take $100 today because they could 
invest it and watch it grow to be greater than $101 a year later. This assumption, 
that $100 today is worth more than $100 a year from now is called the ‘Time Value 
of Money’ principle. If the prevailing interest rate is 4%, then a rational person 
would only prefer sums greater than $104 a year from now, instead of $100 today. 
The amount that any value is discounted annually is called the discount rate. If the 
prevailing interest rate is high, then the observable discount rate229 is high and the 
present value of future money decreases, because we expect even greater returns in 
the future.  
This same principle (Time Value of Money) holds for costs just as it does for 
returns. Now the question is, would you rather pay $100 today, or $104 a year from 
now? What would you pay now, to avoid costs later? The answer still depends on 
the prevailing interest rate, that is the discount rate in this context, but the present 
value of money always decreases as the event (cost or return) moves further into 
the future. Soil erosion has to do with discount rates in that the cost of soil erosion is 
a cost felt in the distant future once the topsoil has been so severely eroded that 
yields plummet and farmers face the cost of lost productivity. Assuming a farmer 
does in fact weigh this distant cost when making decisions in the present, the 
present value of the future cost of lost productivity from soil erosion, is discounted 
over time and the resulting present value of this lost productivity becomes 
inadequately small for inspiring any change of market behavior in the present. 
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There is a parallel between agricultural conservation policy and climate 
change policy; both aim to ‘internalize the externalities’ of industry practices. For 
climate change policy, the goal is to make firms accountable for the greenhouse gas 
emissions that result from their industry practices, incentivizing alternative 
practices that are more ecologically friendly. Likewise, the goal of agricultural 
conservation policy is to make farmers accountable for their ecological footprint and 
to incentivize ecologically friendly farming practices. Within climate change debates, 
economists generally advocate the use of a carbon tax in order to achieve improve 
general welfare. This is a traditional Pigouvian tax strategy of applying the social 
cost of industry practices into the decision making of firms. As I mentioned above, 
the widely respected magazine, The Economist, has long advocated for a carbon 
tax.230 
The discount rates set in climate change models are a key factor in 
determining carbon taxes and other policy implemented costs on industry meant to 
reflect the future costs of ecological damage. As previously illustrated, discounting is 
a procedure for computing the present value of financial flows in the future.231 From 
one side of the debate, there is the argument that using any discount rate in our 
climate-policy models, especially discount rates that reflect the real return of capital 
and the prevailing interest rates, puts future generations at an inherent 
disadvantage by lessening the present weight of future events. Discounting is 
already a part of our behavior and our current behavior is exactly the problem; our 
short-run market forces are failing to feel the weight of distant economic costs until 
it is too late to do anything about it. However, from the other side of the debate 
there is the argument that given the nature of capital returns, discounting is an 
objective and necessary aspect of the present value of future events.  
The debate between Cambridge economist Nicolas Stern and William 
Nordhaus of Yale is an archetype for disagreement over discount rates: ‘the 
alarmist’ vs. ‘the delayer’. Generally, the disagreement is over how much to impose 
                                                        
230 "Some More Thoughts On A Carbon Tax," The Economist. 
231 Cedric Philibert, Discounting The Future, International Society for Ecological Economics (2003), 2, 
http://isecoeco.org/pdf/philibert.pdf  
 91 
the future cost into the present through the use of climate policy, but the heart of the 
debate lies in Nordhaus’s disagreement with the near-zero time discount rate used 
by Stern’s climate change model in his famed Stern Review. Nicolas Stern, former 
World Bank chief economist published the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate 
Change in 2006, a research publication sponsored by the UK government that 
argued for urgent policy action in order to prevent the future damage of climate 
change.232 Stern’s results were more dramatic than most reviews that came before 
his because the discount rates used in his economic models were set extremely low. 
Discounting involves two related concepts: the discount rate of goods and the ‘time 
discount rate’. The discount rate of goods (also called the real return on capital or 
the real interest rate) is a positive economic concept233 that is, in principle, the 
observable discount rate in the market, which is known to range from about 5 to 26 
percent per year.234 The ‘time discount rate’ (also known as the pure rate of social 
time preference) is a normative value that represents the relative weight of the 
economic welfare of various households and generations over time. This refers to 
the discount of future welfare, not future goods or capital returns. A zero time 
discount rate means that all generations are treated symmetrically with present 
generations. Stern applied a 0.1 percent time discount rate, and combined this 0.1 
time discount rate with a variety of discount rates of goods for the various different 
goods that are relevant to climate change and the associated real return of capital 
for these goods, and came up with a 1.4 full discount rate, which was in turn applied 
to his economic climate change models.235 In defense of the low time discount rate, 
Stern argues that basic human ethics calls for the recognition of intergenerational 
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common humanity and historical responsibility. The Stern Review concludes that 
without climate-policy action, climate change will be the greatest market failure in 
human history and is estimated to cost 5 percent of the global GDP every year 
indefinitely and could range up to a loss of 20 percent of the global GDP annually.236 
However, William Nordhaus is skeptical of the conclusions of the Stern 
Review because of the assumptions made about discounting. Firstly, Nordhaus 
argues that the ethical stance from which Stern draws his discount rate isn’t quite so 
universal as his Review might have one believe. He claims that the Review’s near zero 
discount rate is based on utilitarian reasoning and brings with it all of the 
complications of that viewpoint, most infamously that the ends always justify the 
means. Supposedly, there are many alternative ethical stances which justify 
discounting; a Rawlsian ethics, where societies should maximize the wellbeing of 
the poorest generation, which we assume is us, and so consumption should be at 
maximum now; or a precautionary ethics where societies minimize consumption 
while maintaining the path closest to risking overconsumption. Nordhaus argues 
there are a multitude of various different time preference rates that are each 
justifiable.237 I however find his arguments unconvincing. He fails to clearly provide 
any justification for putting future generations at an extreme disadvantage in our 
decision making process. 
Nordhaus accuses Stern of playing into political pressures of the UK 
government and giving them an unambiguous answer that urgent and sharp 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions were necessary in order to prevent 
widespread market collapse. President Harry Truman famously complained that 
economists always told him this on the one hand, and that on the other hand. He 
wanted a one-handed economist. The Stern Review was essentially a one-handed 
report with an argument for urgent policy action in mind. However, economics is 
rarely so simple, especially not an intertemporal economic model over centuries 
with, not only known unknowns, but innumerable unknown unknowns. According 
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to Nordhaus, the question has always been, to what degree, how fast and how much, 
to impose a carbon tax, and the use of a near-zero percent time discount rate is not 
by any means a silver-bullet to answering this fundamental question of climate 
change policy.238  
Although Nordhaus doubts the economic models and assumptions used by 
Stern, he commends the Review for pointing out climate change policies that can 
align economic priorities with environmental dangers. Nordhaus agrees with Stern 
that the cost of carbon emissions must be raised in order to incentivize individuals 
and firms into more environmentally friendly practices, and to stimulate research 
and development into low-carbon technologies. It’s a simple economic insight that 
the social costs of the distant future must be reflected onto the everyday decision-
making of billions of individuals and firms in the present.239 
The debate over climate change policy provides a useful parallel with 
agricultural policy. Just as the debate between Nordhaus and Stern over climate 
change policy isn’t about whether or not to impose a carbon tax, because the need 
for a carbon tax in general is widely accepted amongst economists, the question 
becomes, what is the appropriate amount for a carbon tax? Likewise, if we accept 
that a Pigouvian tax strategy applied to the externalities of agriculture would be a 
good policy, then the next question becomes, how high should a soil erosion tax be? 
Discounting is major factor in determining the efficient level for any Pigouvian tax.  
Discounting is an undeniable fact of economic behavior. Rational economic 
agents behave in a way so that money is more valuable today then tomorrow. When 
a homeowner takes out a mortgage of $150,000 to buy a $200,000 home, it’s 
worthwhile even though over the course of paying off the mortgage, it will be more 
expensive than the original $150,000. At a 6 percent interest rate over 30 years, that 
mortgage would cost $323,759. This isn’t unfair, because the extra $173,759 from 
accumulated interest represents the opportunity cost of capital growth over that 
period of time. The homeowner who took out this mortgage made this decision 
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based on the rationale that having an additional $150,000 in the present was worth 
paying an additional $173,759 later. In this way, discounting is fair and fundamental 
to economic theory, because investments and capital are productive over time. 240 
Yet, one can argue, it remains fundamentally problematic that rational decision-
makers discount the value of ecological damages in the distant future. Our 
systematic disregard for ecological limits might justifying Stern’s use of a very low 
discount rate in order to correct present markets. 
At first, it seems imperative that a near-zero percent discount rate is used in 
order to fairly account for the real damages of the future due to soil erosion. It 
seems shortsighted to argue for discount rates of 5 percent in climate change 
models (or presumably in soil erosion tax models), like Jerry Taylor, a writer for the 
conservative think tank Cato Institute does. In Taylor’s defense, 5 percent is roughly 
the observable discount rate, the real return of capital, representative of the 
prevailing interest rates, and thus accurate of how we really behave in the 
market.241 But a 5 percent discount rate means that the weight of distant events like 
climate change are not felt until it’s far too late. From the viewpoint of positive 
economists like Nordhaus and Taylor, it is simply an economic fact that the present 
value of ecological catastrophes is discounted over time. Their evidence is the 
observable economic behavior. But this is exactly the problem! Current economic 
behavior is failing to adequately value future natural resources and ecological 
disasters. The parameters of the market are pushing farmers and agribusiness into 
remaining financially solvent and price competitive in the present, but failing to 
adjust for long-run consequences. It is not the job government economic policy to be 
practice only factual positive economics, without value judgments. Government 
policy is one place where normative economic value judgments are essential. 
Positive economists like Nordhaus and Taylor might argue that the observed 
discount rate suggests that we value possessing the financial means to address 
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incoming disasters more than forgoing growth in the name of avoiding those 
disasters. But this is still only a description of what we have already done, not what 
we should do.  
I’m definitely more sympathetic with Stern than Nordhaus. Discounting is a 
fact of normal economic behavior, which has led us down a disastrous path where 
we fail to value the long run costs of our actions, like ecological costs. Nonetheless, 
Nordhaus and other critics of Stern bring forward legitimate objections, the most 
persuasive of which that we need to account for alternative investments and 
opportunity costs. Nordhaus writes: 
A portfolio of efficient investments would definitely include ones to slow 
global warming. But it also includes investments in other priority areas—
health systems at home, cures for tropical diseases, education around the 
world, and basic research on all kinds of new technologies. Investments to 
slow global warming should compete with other investments, and the 
discount rate is the measuring rod for comparing competing investments.242 
According to the critics of Stern, a soil erosion tax should be one of many 
investments towards greater social welfare. This investment would be like an 
insurance policy against the probable long run costs that would result from 
continuing the current trends of soil erosion. In order for agricultural policy makers 
to implement a soil erosion tax, they must make assumptions about discount rates 
used in their models for estimating the appropriate tax value. Discounting is key to 
determining how much to invest in a soil erosion tax insurance policy and any such 
soil erosion tax will require economic models very similar to those of Stern and 
Nordhaus. 
Although Stern and Nordhaus disagree on the degree of climate policy action 
that should be taken, they both see the utility of an emissions tax for incentivizing 
better industry practices. Likewise, a soil erosion tax would have great usefulness, 
even if its social efficiency value were underestimated. I think that discounting, 
despite being a rational aspect of economic behavior, is exactly the problem of 
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commercial values and ecological sustainability, but in the interest of crafting a 
pragmatic agricultural policy that follows the path of least political resistance, the 
discount rates used in a soil erosion tax should be set conservatively. The use of a 
soil erosion tax would provide a path for maximizing profits over the long run. It 
would essentially be an insurance policy against the risks of soil erosion. In order to 
avoid the damages of soil erosion that are probable in the distant future, we should 
invest small amounts annually by paying additional costs for the farming practices 
that are estimated to lead to greater erosion. We must redefine markets so that our 





3.4 Learning from history 
 
The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a non-profit organization 
dedicated to empowering people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment. 
Their strategy for accomplishing this goal is by researching complex issues on 
toxins, food, agriculture, children’s health, energy, and water, and simplifying the 
problems for consumer awareness. EWG is also a significant lobbying force in 
Washington for environmental reform. EWG enters the conversation about 
agricultural with the bias that strict environmental regulation is necessary for 
correcting the tendencies of unregulated commercial behavior. 243  
The Environmental Working Group’s Publication, Losing Ground, presents a 
good summary of the issue of at hand, acknowledging the prevalence of 
unsustainable soil erosion and the systematic flaws of lowering erosion rates; their 
summary includes items discussed in Part B Section 1 of this essay such as 
inaccurate T-values, and soil erosion models that consistently underestimate the 
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real amount of erosion that is occurring. However, the recommended policy 
solutions of the authors are politically unpragmatic. They call on congress to reopen 
and revise the conservation compliance policies of the 1985 farm bill that were 
removed by the 1996 farm bill and to require the following in order to remain 
eligible for the rest of farm support: 
 Reduce soil erosion to below T-values 
 Treat and prevent the formation of ephemeral gullies on all 
agricultural land, not just highly erodible land 
 Plant a vegetative buffer of at least 35 feet between row crops and 
watersheds 
 Exclude farmers who do not comply with these conservation 
measures from participating in crop and revenue insurance 
programs. 
 Exclude farmers who convert native prairie grass into row crops. 244 
 
EWG believes that conservation compliance will be an adequate solution to 
the unsustainable loss of soil resources, despite their acknowledgment that is has 
failed in the past. But what evidence is there to think conservation compliance will 
finally be successful this time? There are reasons why conservation compliance has 
been inadequate in the past - most importantly, the lack of support from farmers for 
strict localized oversight - and there is little reason to think things have changed.  
Erosion is a cost of farming. Farmers’ behavior will not adjust until markets 
represent that cost. To their accredit, the recommendations of EWG would adjust 
markets so that what is economical for American farmers is improved conservation 
practices. Also, the suggestions of EWG are slightly revised from the conservation 
compliance policy of the 1985 Food Security Act. The ‘85 farm bill mandated that 
farmers establish a ‘conservation plan’ and was problematically vague. Here, the 
EWG suggests that conservation compliance should be defined by operating with 
soil erosion rates under assigned T-values. 
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However there are complications with the EWG’s suggestions. What T-values 
will they use? Even if one could find an accurate T-value for every plot of land, it 
would be unrealistic to expect that the USDA could set a benchmark for total soil 
erosion sustainability at some specified time after the legislation. Despite the use of 
the best available conservation practices, soil erosion often remains greater than 
what is actually tolerable. Demanding that farmers practice with erosion rates that 
mirror soil formation rates sets up farmers for an impossible task and it would be 
unreasonable to expect NRCS agents to cut all of the farmers from the income 
support they depend on if they do not ‘comply’. If policy makers were to use T-
values as the measurement for conservation compliance, T-values would instead 
need to lower than true soil erosion tolerance, like the currently existing T-levels. 
But then farmers would be at risk of losing their government farm support based 
upon an arbitrary standard. EWG might respond that the Pigouvian tax strategy that 
I recommend of low-balling the social cost of soil erosion also results in an arbitrary 
standard, and this is true. But the difference is that in the case of a soil erosion tax 
farmers are not forced to comply at the threat of bankruptcy to the arbitrary 
standards that we set for practicality’s sake.  
Another complication to conservation compliance is the idea of putting 
farmers under the threat of bankruptcy. US farm policy always has, and for the 
practical purposes of a pragmatic policy maker, always will exist for the interests of 
American farmers. It is impractical of the EWP and other environmentalists to pit 
themselves against the interests of farmers and agribusinesses in order to establish 
conservation – these groups essentially write the farm bill. But beyond pragmatism, 
this severe penalty of violating conservation compliance would unreasonably leave 
farmers at the mercy of weather and climate. It would make the case that one year, 
despite the best attempts at implementing conservation practices, one farmer’s 
erosion rates might be estimated to be above T-values, disqualifying them for farm 
support, while another farmer who implements less conservation practices is lucky 
with the weather and suffers no consequences. Then there is the problem that once 
farmers are below the benchmark of these arbitrary and unrealistically high T-
values, there is no further incentive for conservation practices. 
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One could avoid the problems inherent in using T-values by creating 
conservation compliance standards of implementing specific farming practices, 
decided at the local level by NRCS agencies. This suddenly empowered NRCS could 
mandate that all farmers eligible for government support must practice no-till 
farming (whether that be no-till year-round, every year, or some tilling allowed) and 
plant filter strips along the edge of their fields, riparian buffers where streams run, 
contour strips and vegetative barriers across slopes in the middle of fields, and 
grass waterways in the places where ephemeral gullies form. This approach would 
be preferable to that of enforcing the T-value benchmark, because it is easy to 
measure and hold farmers accountable for implementing specific practices. 
However it is difficult to see how the local NRCS agents could determine standards 
fairly in each situation without some objective measurement. 
More importantly there is an issue of enforcement, which we have seen has 
been a problem in earlier programs. In order to ensure that conservation 
compliance is strictly enforced, there would need to be a strict overrule of the local 
NRCS agents over the farmers and their conservation practices. Few farmers or 
NRCS agents want a system of ‘soil cops’. Even if such a tight oversight and 
authoritative bureaucracy is desirable, it’s unreasonable to think it would ever be 
sustained by the involvement of local farmers after it is put into place by federal 
legislation. The failure of strict oversight on private land through the use of soil 
conservation committees was a lamentation of Lewis Cecil Gray, Worster’s hero of 
the New Deal Agricultural reform, long before the failure of conservation 
compliance since the 1985 farm bill. And now the EWG suggests we try the same 
approach again. History warrants a new approach. We need to learn from the failed 
attempts of the past and implement an appropriate and more effective agricultural 
conservation policy. 
 
3.5 Farmers and Agribusiness Should Support a Soil Erosion Tax  
 
The idea of placing a soil erosion tax onto farmers would probably be met 
with immediate hostility by the farmer and agribusiness lobby. However, I believe 
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that such a knee jerk reaction against a soil erosion tax is mistaken and that if 
farmers and agribusiness consider its benefits and the alternatives, a soil erosion tax 
is the best way for farmers to practice sustainably while remaining financially 
solvent.  
The fact that US farm policy always has been and still is a tool almost 
exclusively for the economic interests of farmers should not discredit the 
practicality of conservation policy. It is entirely within long-run profit seeking 
behavior to conserve soil. If we do not conserve our nation’s soil there will 
eventually be no more economic opportunity in agriculture (never mind the fact 
that we would starve first, or that skyrocketing prices of food would never actually 
allow us to erode or deplete all of our topsoil). Even within a purely commercialized 
view of the world, soil conservation remains an urgent priority.  
Farmers and agribusiness have not yet established sustainable soil 
conservation by their own accord because of significant obstacles. Firstly, there is no 
individual, or group of farmers in control of agriculture markets; the US agricultural 
market is instead more like a magnificent beast which is pulled in this and that 
direction by the demands and competitive advantages of the global economy, then 
meagerly called in another direction by political forces like the farm bill and the 
NRCS. Even the most massive agribusinesses do not have the power to suddenly 
decide to practice completely sustainable agriculture (whatever that would entail) 
and implement the necessary and expensive conservations measures. Any 
agribusiness acting alone would likely suffer by mandating even simple 
conservation practices such as alternating crops with cultivated fallows. Too many 
farmers would decide to affiliate with a different agribusiness that does not impose 
restrictions. It is incredibly difficult for a single farmer or agribusiness firm to 
behave with long run ecological considerations because there is a competitive 
advantage for suppliers who produce more efficiently in the short run.  
But remaining price competitive isn’t the only obstacle; the demands of 
consumers hold great sway over the behavior of farmers. Consider the poor 
conversion efficiency of grain to beef. Instead of grazing (grass-fed) cattle, almost all 
beef in the US is now ‘corn-fed’. Because it takes approximately 6-8 pounds of grain 
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to produce 1 pound of beef in the US (worse elsewhere)245 beef demand is 
exponentially grows into higher demand for corn. High demand means better prices 
and so farmers are incentivized to farm more corn and pumping more revenue onto 
their farms. Nonetheless, corn fed beef is a blatantly inefficient use of food and soil 
resources. Even if they wanted, neither the individual corn farmers, the Iowa Corn 
Growers Association, cattle growers nor beef processors could change the market in 
order to streamline production to consumption efficiency and eliminate corn fed 
beef in order to release some of the strain on our soil. If they tried, some other link 
in the supply chain would take their place. Economies have sticking power, and now 
that markets are used to farmers growing millions of acres of corn, and food 
producers are used to processing millions of acres of corn, and consumers are used 
to eating the livestock produced off of feed from millions of acres of corn, things are 
unlikely to change.  
Another obstacle to the marriage of private enterprise and sustainable 
agriculture, mentioned several times now, is the fact that not all costs are 
represented in the decision making of farmers today; the far distant effects of our 
actions remain unfelt to us. And so, the solution proposed is to reframe the short run 
market forces with the long run economic costs of soil erosion in mind. Rather than 
spending billions every year on the farm bill as it stands - a confused patchwork 
safety net that breathes life into a broken system - the US government should 
instead spend billions of dollars collecting data to perfect the USDA and NRCS soil 
erosion models. An advanced soil erosion model could be used to calculate the long 
run cost of every immediate farming practice, impose that given cost onto the 
farmer in the form of a tax and watch the short run market forces defend long run 
soil sustainability. The imposition of a per unit tax on land would raise the cost of 
practicing agriculture to varying degrees246, depending on the predicted soil erosion 
provided by our imaginary advanced model. Farmers would then seek to minimize 
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soil erosion on their land in order to avoid larger taxes. In practice, this would entail 
cooperation between soil erosion estimates on every cultivated field in tandem with 
an annual IRS audit. In this way, agricultural policy could achieve the goals of 
conservation compliance – adjust market conditions so that conservation practices 
are economical for farmers – while avoiding the subjective discretion of localized 
oversight which has historically proven to be the downfall for conservation policies.  
It’s important to recognize that the prevalence of soil erosion is not the result 
of any particularly malicious intent of farmers towards the environment. The 
inability of individuals to change the market as a whole, the nature of price 
competition, the demands of consumers, and the ambiguity of soil erosion and other 
agricultural externalities are all significant obstacles towards reconciling private 
enterprise with sustainable agriculture. A soil erosion tax is the most feasible way of 
overcoming these obstacles because it holds every farmer accountable to the same 
standard, while also respecting the autonomy of farmers to implement conservation 
practices as they see fit. This policy would increase the costs of farming, but over 
time the price of agricultural commodities would rise to account for the tax costs 
and farmers would be not disastrously affected. If the transition to the new market 
equilibrium puts too much strain onto farmers, they could still be protected under 
the traditional farm support system. Furthermore, gaining tax revenue is not the 
purpose of a soil erosion tax, or any Pigouvian tax, but it certainly would be an 
added benefit for what has historically been a costly US farm policy.  
US farm policy already has some methods for representing the long run 
ecological costs of practicing agriculture into the present. But unfortunately, the 
existing policies fall far short of fostering sustainable agriculture. And so 
reconfiguring these market conditions to better represent the future costs of 
present action would not be anything new in principle, though more assertive policy 
action may be the necessary change for achieving our economic and environmental 
goals. Assertive conservation policy has typically been opposed by the farmer and 
agribusiness lobby, but if these interest groups carefully consider the opportunity 
provided by a soil erosion tax - taking a significant step in the direction of soil 
 103 
sustainability while remaining on the same playing field of every other US farmer, 




 This section will not go into great detail or length into the externalities that 
would result from implementing a soil erosion tax, but merely to point a few that 
seem likely. I lack the broad knowledge necessary for a full-blown defense of a soil 
tax in terms of its consequences. The bulk of this essay has relied on mostly 
historical justifications for a soil erosion tax, but the purpose of this section is to 
briefly consider some of the probable externalities from imposing a soil erosion tax.  
The imposition of a soil erosion tax would make US agricultural commodities 
less competitive on the global market. Taxes increase the price of production. A per 
acre tax on soil erosion would increase the price of land and the price of practicing 
agriculture. If the costs of farming are increased in the US, but not elsewhere, then 
American agricultural commodities will have a competitive disadvantage in the 
global market. Although this might seem like a bad thing for US farm policy to be 
doing to its own farmers, from a global justice perspective, this would be a 
significant step in the right direction. The presence of cheap agricultural 
commodities from outside exports can lower prices so that the revenue of farmers 
in developing nations falls below sufficient operating costs. Price competition has 
been identified as the chief culprit by global agriculture academics, like Mazoyer and 
Roudart, authors of A History of World Agriculture. They believe that in order to 
establish a prosperous and ecologically harmonious agriculture around the world, 
there cannot be price competition for agricultural commodities in the same way as 
other economic goods. Global justice activists Mazoyer and Roudart see the patterns 
of trade liberalization as problematic. The liberalization of global trade allows for 
the most price efficient producers to expand and dominate global markets. The 
problem is that farmers in developing countries are not always the most price-
efficient. Rural farmers around the world have been suffering from a global 
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agricultural market where consumption tends to align with the lowest prices.247 
Often the lowest prices align with the exporters of surplus produce such as the 
United States who exported over $140 billion in agricultural commodities in 
2014.248 Although the imposition of a soil erosion tax would not end the global 
agricultural price war that puts the farmers of the developing world at a 
disadvantage and reaffirms the cycle of global poverty, a soil erosion tax would 
increase the price of American produced agricultural economies and would 
therefore promote increased prices and revenue for poor farmers around the world. 
There simply aren’t a lot of market opportunities in developing countries. When 
manufacturing giants like China, Germany and the US dominate global markets, 
there are significant disadvantages and barriers to entry for small manufacturers. 
Agriculture is one industry that every nation has a very viable capacity for – that is 
until excessive imports from America and Europe drive prices too low for local 
farmers. And so the soil erosion tax externality of decreased US exports seems 
unproblematic in the grand scheme. 
Another externality of a soil erosion tax is the potential for putting farmers 
below the costs of operation with the newly imposed costs of the tax. For this 
reason, farm policy should continue to protect farmers against downside risk, 
primarily through the use of crop and revenue insurance programs. The purpose of 
US agricultural policy to promote the welfare of American agriculture, so there is no 
reason to harm US farmers and agribusinesses. Agribusinesses are indeed very 
much concerned with finding what is sustainable, but no individual within the 
market has the power to totally redefine the market – they instead react to the 
market conditions already in place. Farmers and agribusiness understand that the 
current rate of soil erosion is not sustainable. But decreasing the amount of acres 
planted on, utilizing crop rotations and fallows to the degree of complete soil 
erosion sustainability, seems impossible at the moment. If some individual farmer 
or agribusiness committed wholeheartedly to soil sustainability as the ultimate 
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deciding factor in all of their decisions, they would need to decrease the frequency 
of planting on each acre in order to allow for the slow regeneration of natural 
topsoil. It would become incredibly difficult for this individual to remain price 
competitive against their neighbors who continue to practice immediately cost 
effective agriculture. This is why the correction of US agricultural must instead come 
from government policy, a greater regulating force that can ensure all individuals 
within that market behave with a mind for the cost of sustainability. Because there 
is no reason to blame or punish farmers and agribusiness, the continued protection 
against downside risk for farmers seems reasonable. Also the imposition of the tax 
should be phased in over time so that farmers and the market are able to adjust to 
the increased costs of farming. 
Farm policy can continue to protect farmers against downside risk and total 
bankruptcy. However another related and more complicated externality is the 
disadvantage of farmers on highly erodible land, often-poorer farmers. Some might 
say that it’s not fair to craft a tax that disadvantages those who own highly erodible 
land. I would counter by saying that this tax is fair in the sense that all erosion is 
treated as equally problematic and that we are imposing the real costs of that 
erosion through cold cut and unwavering environmental justice. Surely, this would 
not be to the advantage of farmers on highly erodible land – too bad. If erosion on 
some given land is so severe that the social costs of erosion when imposed onto the 
farmer put them at an extreme competitive disadvantage, then land shouldn’t be 
farmed. 
 Also the price of food would likely increase in the US (just like gas taxes raise 
prices for consumers) causing problems for those who live on minimum wage. But 
the price of food wouldn’t not rise significantly if farmers’ revenue is increased to 
match the increased costs from the tax. I’m not really endorsing that the 
government increases subsidies along with the tax so that food prices remain stable, 
but I’m pointing out that it’s an option. With this option, the soil erosion tax code 
would incentivize conservation practices while farmers’ balance sheets would 








Worster argued that capitalistic values are at the root of agriculture’s 
problems and that a system of individuals seeking ever-greater financial returns is 
inherently flawed and will never foster an agricultural industry that is in harmony 
with ecological limits. However, it is not the luxury of government policy to 
suddenly and dramatically change the pathway of our economy. Instead, I have 
argued in Part B for a government policy that establishes the market conditions of 
private enterprise in a way that profit-seeking behavior is identical to ecologically 
sustainable behavior. One straightforward solution with this goal in mind is to 
impose the long run cost of soil erosion onto the present actions that lead to soil 
erosion – essentially a ‘carbon tax’ approach applied to agriculture.  
 
 
Part C: Summary and Conclusions 
 
The dust bowl is an archetype for agriculture and ecological limits. The dust 
bowl is relevant to this essay, firstly because it illustrates the primacy of market 
forces over ecological considerations in the decision making of farmers, and 
secondly, because the failure of the policy response to the dust bowl to universally 
coerce farmers into applying conservation measures on private land suggests that a 
more pragmatic approach is needed in the face of contemporary environmental 
challenges. Modern US agricultural policy was born during the dust bowl years, yet 
the relationship between private enterprise in agriculture and ecological limits has 
not fundamentally changed in the 83 years since the New Deal agricultural policy 
began.  
The primacy of short run market considerations over ecological ones isn’t to 
say that farmers don’t care about the ecology or conservation, but that in general, 
farmers follow the practice that is cost effective first, then find ways to improve 
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ecological stewardship. Agriculture in the US began seriously infringing on the 
ecological limits of the Great Plains, with the onset of commercial monocropping 
and industrially mechanized agriculture in the early 20th century. There was an 
amazing growth of US agricultural production from 1900 – 1930. Shortsighted 
agricultural practices and speculative growth led farmers to plow up native sod on a 
massive scale in preference for cultivating wheat, often on semi-arid and 
marginalized land like the southern plains. Farmers were like cogs in the machine of 
the global market, claiming homesteads and increasing planting to match the rise in 
demand for agricultural products, with the greatest increase in demand coming 
from WWI. When prices eventually dropped, the market was pushing individual 
farmers into increasing planting in a last ditch effort to avoid bankruptcy, but 
instead extreme oversupply ensued along with an extended wind erosion disaster 
like never before seen. The decades of speculative growth leading up to the 1930s, 
and the dust bowl itself exemplified how the trends of commercial agriculture and 
the limits of our ecology can contradict one another.  
Donald Worster’s Dust Bowl was a groundbreaking work in critical 
environmental history and I agree with Worster’s general thesis, that a system of 
individuals seeking ever-greater financial returns will never foster an agricultural 
industry that is in harmony with ecological limits. However, Worster’s prescribed 
solution, a revision of cultural values, is not a practical policy solution. Agricultural 
policy, like any government policy, tends to shift the already existing system in 
small, but hopefully meaningful ways, little by little. Whether or not change is 
preferable through the slow methods of government policy (as opposed to perhaps 
some radical revolution and ownership change of American agriculture) is not 
within the scope of this essay. Instead this essay asks: how can policy makers work 
towards the marriage of private enterprise and sustainable agriculture? 
Worster pointed out that the policy makers of 1930s aimed to accomplish 
this through localized grassroots community oversight. The idea was that the 
federal government was an inappropriate authority for mandating agricultural 
conservation and would never be accepted by farmers. Therefore, localized 
oversight, committees comprised of farmers, would be a better system for ensuring 
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that soil conservation was implemented on private land.  Worster depicted the 
situation as if these local committees of strict oversight were formed and then 
quickly dissolved into nothing because there wasn’t enough political support and 
involvement from farmers on the local level for policing each other and restricting 
their own profits in the name of ecological stewardship. But from what I have 
gathered, these localized committees still exist today in the same form as always – 
soil conservation districts. Farmers getting assistance from soil conservation 
districts is voluntary – the districts lack the authority to coerce farmers into 
implementing conservation practices against their will. The localized committees 
lacked the power that New Deal policy makers like Bennett and Gray hoped to 
establish. The dust bowl illustrated that policy makers do not lightly overcome the 
autonomy of farmers. Therefore a successful and pragmatic agricultural policy 
ought to respect the autonomy of farmers’ private decision making, when possible. 
This means that farmers should be the ones who choose to implement conservation 
practices on their land, and they should do so on their own terms.  
Merging the two previously mentioned lessons of the dust bowl together, 
that farmers are primarily concerned with short run market forces, and that a 
successful agricultural policy should be a pragmatic one that respects the autonomy 
of farmers on their own land, a soil erosion tax would be a straightforward means of 
incentivizing conservation practices. A soil erosion tax is a way of directly affecting 
the short run market forces of farmers so that farming practices that reduce erosion 
are more cost effective, and it would leave the farmer autonomous, implementing 
conservation on their own terms and free to not implement certain conservation 
practices if they so choose. 
History is filled with examples where unaddressed soil erosion resulted in 
the decline of civilizations. Lowdermilk’s survey of ancient agricultural lands found 
many examples of failed agricultures that expired with the erosion of their soil. The 
risk remains the same with contemporary soil erosion.  
Taking a cue from Lowdermilk, one can simplify the issue of soil erosion and 
conservation agriculture (ignoring many of the complexities of land degradation and 
soil health) as seeking a permanent agriculture defined by establishing equal soil 
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formation and erosion rates. There have been fewer studies on soil formation rates 
on agricultural land relative to erosion rates. Soil scientists understand the process 
of soil formation, but the rates of formation under cultivation remain ambiguous. It’s 
easier to quantify soil erosion than formation. However there is a host of literature 
on the effects of crop litter removal (especial corn stover) on soil health. 
Maintaining a layer of crop litter is an important agronomic technique for lowering 
erosion rates, but also for increasing soil formation rates and soil organic material 
(SOM). In comparison, there have been many studies on soil erosion rates and the 
USDA has been continuously developing and improving upon their soil erosion 
estimation models. Soil scientists have gained a solid understanding of how erosion 
rates vary on specific fields with various inputs, but there remain significant 
obstacles to overcome in estimating soil erosion, most prominent of which being 
ephemeral gulley erosion. Additionally, there has been significant progress in the 
implementation of soil conservation practices, such as no-till farming. But our best 
agronomic techniques are not yet a cure all for the problems of soil erosion, and 
worse, they remain far from universally adopted.  
There are important and simple facts to be considered by policy makers on 
the status of soil erosion and formation rates, and our agronomy for improving 
them: 1) The stakes are high when it comes to soil erosion; maintaining the stock, 
health, and productivity of our soil is fundamental to the longevity of our 
civilization, 2) We lack adequate data, and consequently understanding, of the soil 
formation and erosion rates that are prevalent under cultivation, 3) there are 
beneficial conservation practices that are proven to work, yet these practices are 
not implemented across the board. These three aforementioned facts are not highly 
contentious. Policy makers should accept these basic facts of the matter and then 
decide how we should proceed.  
I argue that these facts justify implementing a soil erosion tax. Taxing soil 
erosion would greatly increase the prevalence of currently available conservation 
practices across the board. We possess the means for practicing conservation 
agriculture on a more widespread scale than is done, but the incentives are in the 
wrong place. Taxing ‘bads’, like soil erosion, would be a simple yet effective way for 
 110 
adjusting these incentives. Furthermore, it’s important to strive for a complete 
understanding of that which is taxed, and so farm bill spending ought to allocate 
more funds to the USDA and NRCS for research, data collection, and erosion 
modeling. 249 Soil erosion models should be continuously improved upon, as well as 
our understanding of the costs associated with soil erosion. The fact that Rick 
Cruse’s ongoing and cutting-edge research into the economic costs and yield 
declines from soil erosion is the result of a grant for only $15,768 from the Leopold 
Center is ridiculous and sad. Given the history of failed agriculture and expired 
civilizations, understanding the real economic impact of soil erosion so that the 
appropriate costs can be accounted for should be one of the most important and 
well-funded of research endeavors around, yet it seems to be on the fringes of 
politician’s and mainstream academia’s concerns.  
Like the dust bowl, significant lessons can be learned from the history of US 
agricultural policy since WWII. Examining this time period gives one a sense of how 
stuck we’ve become in the price support system that inflates the value of 
agricultural commodities, and also how difficult it is to phase out farm bill spending. 
It also provides further justification for reforming agricultural conservation policy 
into a system that doesn’t depend on local initiative for its success.  
Since Hugh Bennett and the creation of the SCS, the goal of agricultural 
conservation policy has been to better represent the long run costs of ecological 
damage into the present decision making of farming. Land retirement programs 
have been a staple of conservation policy since the beginning, effectively making 
what was long run ecologically beneficial, cost effective in the short run for farmers. 
But throughout the history of conservation programs, conservation policies were 
almost exclusively implemented when they were to the economic advantage of 
farmers. Oversupply in the 1930s made land retirement programs a practical means 
for limiting production and thereby contributing to the general prosperity of 
                                                        
249 Or even without a soil erosion tax, the further research, data collection and precise understanding 
of soil erosion would help farmers identify the costs of soil erosion and implement conservation 
agriculture to a greater degree. Although this alone would likely be insufficient, largely because of 
discounting behavior, and also because of the primacy of short run market demands for farmers to 
remain price competitive. 
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farmers. The USDA and federal government then took advantage of the increased 
demand stimulated by WWII and the Korean war and raised price floors, pumping 
money into and revitalizing the rural economy, but making the ACP land retirement 
program less of a preferential option for farmers. Once wartime demand subdued, 
soil conservation once again became a practical way to limit supply and thereby 
prevent overproduction and contribute to the prosperity of farmers, resulting in the 
creation of the Soil Bank in the 60s. Starting in the 60s, farm policy then shifted 
some of its focus away from price floors and government non-recourse loans, and 
aimed to supplement farmer’s income by stimulating demand. This led, in part, to 
political momentum for the Food for Peace program, food stamps and school lunch 
programs, which increased the demand for agricultural commodities, and raised 
prices. Global demand then skyrocketed for US agricultural commodities with the 
onset of the recession in the 70s, because the weak dollar made for relatively more 
price competitive US exports. But eventually the dollar recovered and US exports 
shrank. Reacting to the threat of falling export demand, the 1985 farm bill protected 
the US export market by using controversial export subsidies and international 
marketing programs. In part, it was for the sake of farmers’ prosperity that the ‘85 
farm bill strengthened the role of soil conservation, because restricting aggregate 
production was economical in the context of falling prices. But contrary to this last 
point and the pre-existing paradigm of conservation policy being used as a means 
for strategic scarcity and farmer’s prosperity, the conservation compliance of the 
1985 bill was a major shift.  
The conservation compliance attempt of the ‘85 farm bill represented a more 
assertive conservation policy that would no longer simply serve the short run 
economic interests of farmers and for the first time would force farmers to comply 
to conservation standards in order to be eligible for farm support.  Ultimately, 
conservation compliance failed for some of the same reasons that the ideal localized 
committees of Dr. Gray failed; policing one’s peers and neighbors proved much 
more problematic in practice than in theory. The ’85 conservation compliance policy 
mandated that farmers establish a ‘conservation plan’ on ‘highly erodible land,’ 
intentionally vague so that what qualifies as a sufficient ‘conservation plan was left 
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to the discretion of local SCS (NRCS after 1994) agencies. But when failing to comply 
resulted in farmers totally losing their farm support package, SCS agents were 
reluctant to put their neighbors under the threat of bankruptcy, especially when 
they had the option of not punishing farmers, since there were no specific guidelines 
of what compliance entailed. The 1996 farm bill was the next major legislation in 
agricultural policy and it removed the threat of losing eligibility for the rest of farm 
support from the conservation compliance measure. 
 Conservation policies exist today that prevent farmers from tilling native sod, 
provide payments for land retirement, and even some that provide the technical 
assistance and payment incentives for implementing conservation practices on 
private land, though the latter kind of programs are, in general, insufficiently 
funded. But these policies are fragmented in their different ends and fail to address 
the underlying issue of unaccounted for externalities. And because the existing 
conservation policies do not address the fundamental problem of unaccounted for 
externalities head on, current policy fails to incentivize the widespread adoption of 
simple conservation practices in the way that a soil erosion tax would. Even though 
conservation policy has remained a staple of the farm bill throughout its entire 
history, it has been politically achievable primarily because of its role as 
orchestrating scarcity for the sake of raising prices in a manner that is advantageous 
for farmers. US agricultural policy has always been tool for securing the economic 
prosperity of farmer.  
A soil erosion tax is a kind of Pigouvian tax, which is a preferred policy 
strategy for many economists and a relatively mainstream one. Simplified, the 
Pigouvian strategy is to tax social ‘bads’ that are not felt upon the person who acts in 
the way that leads to the specific cost, and to subsidies social ‘goods’ in the same 
way. Pigouvian taxes are a traditional approach of modern welfare economic theory. 
A common criticism against the use of a Pigouvian tax for agricultural policy is that 
in order to estimate the appropriate social cost, one would need omniscient 
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knowledge about a seemingly innumerable number of assumptions and 
estimations.250  
 But like the writers of the Economist point out251, the fact that it is difficult 
and perhaps impossible to find the perfectly accurate social cost that would lead to a 
tax with the greatest social efficiency does not justify abandoning the project 
altogether. By lowballing the estimated social cost, policy makers can improve the 
status quo while offering a strong argument for its implementation; it’s the least that 
we can afford to tax. Additionally, there already exists a host of research and 
publications on models for estimating the social costs of agricultural externalities 
that could be used as a starting point for policy makers, and continually improved 
upon through further government research. 
 Just as the Economist’s defense of a carbon tax is analogous to a defense of a 
soil erosion tax, the entire phenomenon of climate change is analogous to soil 
erosion, along with the policy approaches to each. Both policies aim to address the 
impending market failures that result from discounting the far distant future costs 
of production. The Nordhaus vs. Stern debate brings to focus the contentious role 
that discounting plays in the way we consider ecological costs and I find that 
ultimately Sterns argument for a low discount rate is far more convincing. But 
because elsewhere in this essay I have maintained that a successful agricultural 
policy needs to be pragmatic one,252 policy makers should recognize the criticisms 
of Nordhaus and utilize moderate discount rates in their soil erosion tax estimation 
so that the policy garners more widespread political support.  
 The most important political support to garner for agricultural policy reform 
and the shift to a soil erosion tax (or other Pigouvian tax applied to agriculture) is 
that of farmers and the agribusiness lobby. Although it seems counterintuitive for 
                                                        
250 On a basic level for a soil erosion tax, this would entail knowing quantity of soil lost on each unit of 
cultivated land, and the associated economic cost. Estimating each of with accuracy is indeed 
problematic without omniscience. What crops will be planted in the future? How will seed 
technology improve yields over time.  
251 The article in the Economist addresses the carbon tax issue, but is analogous to other Pigouvian 
taxes, like a hypothetical soil erosion tax. 
252 For example the move in Part A conclusions that the economic liberty and total autonomy of 
farmers on their private land should be accepted as a political given and worked around rather than 
pushed against. 
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farmers and agribusinesses to support being taxed, the individuals involved in this 
industry should view a soil erosion tax as an opportunity to achieve their 
environmental goals while remaining financially solvent. It is difficult and perhaps 
impossible for individual farmers and food processors to make the ecological 
considerations they would like while also remaining price competitive. However, a 
soil erosion tax would keep everyone in the US on an even playing field while 
making ecological consideration a part of what it means to be price competitive. 
Also, in the face of mounting political support for radical environmental change, a 
soil erosion tax that preserves the autonomy and economic liberty of farmers is a 
relatively moderate means for achieving sustainable agriculture 
Implementing a soil erosion tax would shift the economy in certain ways. 
Taxes increase the costs of production and would make US farmers less price 
competitive on the global market. From a global justice perspective, this would 
probably be beneficial, increasing prices for farmers in developing countries with 
agrarian economies.  The increased costs of production might potentially be 
problematic for the financial solvency of farmers, but this effect could be counter 
balanced relatively easily by continuing to provide the government farm safety net. 
The simultaneous government policies of a soil erosion tax and a safety net might 
confuse someone to ask, why would farmers be incentivized to implement 
conservation practices if the are going to be protected from bankruptcy by the 
government, regardless of how they farm? The answer to this objection is that 
farmers are profit seeking on the margins; a ‘rational’ farmer will still seek to avoid 
additional costs that result from a soil erosion tax in order to maximize profits, 
regardless of whether or not they are protected from total bankruptcy. The 
increased price of production would also increase the price of food and agricultural 
commodities in the US. This would be problematic for low-income families in the 
short run, but eventually markets would adjust to a new equilibrium where the 
wages of workers adjusts to the inflated price of basic goods. Or perhaps the 
revenue from the soil erosion tax could be used to provide cheaper food to low 
income households. 
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The historical policy approaches to incentivizing conservation agriculture 
have been mostly unsuccessful. The strict oversight through local committees was 
never really established in the late 1930s. Land retirement programs have usually 
only played a role insofar as they contributed to the short run prosperity of farmers, 
being utilized during times of low prices when planned scarcity was advantageous 
to farmers.  And the conservation compliance of the ’85 farm bill was extremely 
unpopular amongst farmers and was politically unpragmatic. History warrants a 
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